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12 Attorneys for Relator  
13 KATHY ORMSBY

14  
15 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
16 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

17  
18 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
*ex rel.* KATHY ORMSBY

19 Plaintiff,

20  
21 v.

22 SUTTER HEALTH, a California not-for-  
profit corporation and PALO ALTO  
23 MEDICAL FOUNDATION, a not-for-profit  
healthcare organization.

24 Defendants.  
25  
26  
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CASE NO. C 15-01062 JD

**FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT  
FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE  
FALSE CLAIMS ACT**

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

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1 On March 6, 2015, Kathy Ormsby filed a sealed *qui tam* complaint as Relator on behalf of  
2 the United States of America against Sutter Health (“Sutter”) and Palo Alto Medical Foundation  
3 (“PAMF”), alleging violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33. By her  
4 complaint, Relator alleged that Sutter, through its affiliates including PAMF, engaged in a fraud  
5 on the Medicare program by its intentional submission of inaccurate and unsupported diagnosis  
6 codes that inflated Sutter’s reimbursements from Medicare Part C, known as the Medicare  
7 Advantage Program.

8 On December 4, 2018, the Government filed a notice of intervention in Relator’s case, and  
9 Relator’s complaint was subsequently unsealed. On March 4, 2019, the United States filed its  
10 Complaint in Intervention against Sutter and PAMF alleging FCA violations relating to  
11 reimbursements from the Medicare Advantage Program for patient care at PAMF (the “PAMF  
12 fraud”).

13 The United States did not intervene with regard to Relator’s allegations of FCA violations  
14 relating to Sutter’s reimbursements from the Medicare Advantage Program for patient care at its  
15 other affiliates (the “Sutter-wide fraud”). Therefore, through this amended complaint, Relator --  
16 upon knowledge with respect to her own acts and those she personally witnessed, and upon  
17 information and belief with respect to all other matters -- maintains her allegations of a Sutter-  
18 wide fraud as follows:

19 **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

20 1. This False Claims Act case is about Sutter’s fraud on Medicare. As a healthcare  
21 provider for tens of thousands of Medicare beneficiaries, Sutter exploited Medicare’s Part C  
22 program to extract hundreds of millions of dollars in payments to treat medical conditions its  
23 patients did not have and provide services its patients did not need and which Sutter ultimately  
24 never provided. Sutter accomplished this scheme through its knowing submission of inaccurate  
25 and unsupported medical information which artificially inflated the reimbursement the Centers  
26 for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) made for the care Sutter provided these Medicare  
27 patients.

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1           2.       Under the Medicare Advantage Program, private health insurance companies  
2 called Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAO”) are authorized to administer Medicare  
3 benefits on behalf of the United States. They offer Medicare Advantage plans to Medicare-  
4 eligible beneficiaries who pay monthly premiums and copayments that are often less than the  
5 coinsurance and deductibles under traditional fee-for-service models for Medicare Parts A and B.  
6 MAOs may then contract with healthcare providers like Sutter for the care of a plan’s  
7 participants. Sutter, through affiliates it owns, controls and/or operates, offers ten Medicare  
8 Advantage plans through three MAOs with which Sutter contracts. Through these ten plans,  
9 Sutter is responsible for providing healthcare to approximately 50,000 eligible Medicare Part C  
10 beneficiaries for which Sutter is reimbursed hundreds of millions of dollars each year.

11           3.       A critical difference between traditional Medicare and the Medicare Advantage  
12 Program is in how CMS pays the MAOs and providers like Sutter with whom they contract. The  
13 goal of the Part C program is to use a capitated payment system “to improve the quality of care  
14 while safeguarding the public fisc.” *United States ex rel. Silingo v. Wellpoint, Inc.*, 904 F.3d 667,  
15 672 (9th Cir. 2018). Since not all beneficiaries require the same level of care, however, the  
16 Medicare Advantage Program requires payments to the private health insurance companies (and  
17 healthcare providers like Sutter) be risk-adjusted annually based on the documented health status  
18 of each beneficiary.

19           4.       In 2004, the Government implemented the Hierarchical Condition Category  
20 (“HCC”) model to calculate risk-adjusted payments for each beneficiary in the Medicare  
21 Advantage Program. The HCC model was intended to compensate healthcare providers like  
22 Sutter based on the medical condition and expected needs of the particular enrollee, with higher  
23 compensation for less healthy patients (who were predicted to require more care), and lower  
24 compensation for more healthy patients (who were predicted to require less care). Healthcare  
25 providers like Sutter submit risk adjustment data, including beneficiary diagnosis data, to the  
26 MAOs which, in turn, submit the risk adjustment data to CMS. CMS uses the HCCs, as well as  
27 demographic characteristics, to calculate a risk score for each beneficiary based on these various  
28 Risk Adjustment Factors (“RAF”). CMS then uses the risk scores to adjust capitated payments

1 up or down for the next payment period. Accurate diagnosis codes reflecting the beneficiary's  
2 medical condition are, therefore, squarely at the heart of the Government goal with the Part C  
3 program of providing the highest quality of healthcare in the most cost-effective manner.

4 5. As of 2017, more than 19 million Americans -- mostly seniors -- were covered  
5 through Medicare Advantage plans, at an estimated annual cost of more than \$206 billion. The  
6 Government Accountability Office has estimated that tens of billions of dollars in these annual  
7 payouts are improper.

8 6. Sutter is a significant part of this problem. With at least 40% of California  
9 Medicare beneficiaries already selecting Medicare Advantage, "Sutter is actively trying to get  
10 more and more people committed" to the Program. But Sutter has done much more than seek out  
11 "more and more" Medicare Advantage patients. It has sought out "more and more" Part C  
12 revenue through a campaign of intentionally inflating its RAF scores and directly undermining  
13 CMS's goal of tying Part C reimbursement to the actual medical condition and healthcare needs  
14 of the patient. Specifically, Sutter failed to take proper steps to ensure the accuracy of the patient  
15 information CMS relied on to calculate how much Sutter would be reimbursed to provide care for  
16 Medicare Advantage patients. Indeed, Sutter ignored repeated red flags that made clear the  
17 patient information it provided was not accurate and thus resulted in Medicare overpayments it  
18 was required to refund. Sutter's fraud did not occur just at PAMF but throughout its network of  
19 affiliates as Relator witnessed first-hand and repeatedly tried to address with Sutter's  
20 management.

21 7. When Sutter refused to heed Relator's warnings about false claims in Sutter's  
22 Medicare Advantage Program and take appropriate action to address its compliance failures and  
23 known overpayments, she filed this *qui tam* lawsuit. Thereafter the Government intervened in the  
24 portion of this case related to the PAMF fraud. Significantly, just two weeks ago, Sutter refunded  
25 CMS \$30 million in overpayments for the improper coding at Sutter affiliates other than PAMF.  
26 This settlement covered medical conditions that -- because of Relator -- Sutter knew were falsely  
27 coded and resulted in Medicare overpayment. As described in more detail below, Sutter was on  
28 notice of these overpayments years ago and is only belatedly making partial refunds to CMS after

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1 Relator’s lawsuit exposed Sutter’s fraudulent scheme. These belated payments do not account for  
2 its False Claims Act liability as to those medical conditions or remedy Sutter’s obligation to  
3 refund the known overpayments for *all the other conditions* it knowingly miscoded for years in a  
4 coordinated scheme to inflate its Medicare Part C reimbursement.

5 **PARTIES**

6 8. Relator Kathy Ormsby, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of  
7 Nevada, was employed at PAMF from May 2013 through May 2015 initially as a RAF Project  
8 Manager then as PAMF’s RAF Coding Manager. As described below, her title changed soon  
9 after her arrival at PAMF to reflect the increased responsibilities she was supposed to have after  
10 discovering Sutter had no compliance program to ensure it provided accurate risk-adjustment data  
11 under the Medicare Advantage Program.

12 9. The United States filed its notice of intervention in this action on December 4,  
13 2018. On March 4, 2019, the United States filed its Complaint in Intervention against Sutter and  
14 PAMF relating to the PAMF fraud. The United States is suing on behalf of the United States  
15 Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which includes its operating division, CMS.  
16 At all times relevant to this lawsuit, CMS administered and supervised Medicare Part C and made  
17 risk-adjustment payments under the Program. The United States is a real party in interest in  
18 Relator’s non-intervened claims with an interest in the outcome of Relator’s case.

19 10. Defendant Sutter is a California not-for-profit corporation headquartered in  
20 Sacramento County. Sutter owns, controls and/or operates affiliated hospitals and physician  
21 foundations throughout California. Sutter controls these affiliated foundations through  
22 overlapping corporate governance boards and executive officers and has done so throughout the  
23 relevant period. Sutter also provides certain centralized support functions to the Sutter system,  
24 which include administrative services and system initiatives.

25 11. Sutter recently consolidated its former five-region structure into two operating  
26 units: a Bay Area operating unit (“Sutter Bay Area”) and a Valley operating unit (“Sutter Valley  
27 Area”). The Sutter Bay Area includes one medical foundation corporation, Sutter Bay Medical  
28 Foundation (“Sutter Bay”), doing business as PAMF, Sutter East Bay Medical Foundation

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1 (“Sutter East Bay”), and Sutter Pacific Medical Foundation (“Sutter Pacific”). The Sutter Valley  
2 Area includes one medical foundation corporation, Sutter Valley Medical Foundation (“Sutter  
3 Valley”), doing business as Sutter Medical Foundation (“Sutter Medical”) and Sutter Gould  
4 Medical Foundation (“Sutter Gould”). Sutter is the sole member of Sutter Bay and Sutter Valley.  
5 Sutter Bay and Sutter Valley contract with multi-specialty medical groups on an exclusive basis  
6 to provide physician services to its patients. Sutter Valley owns most of the property relating to  
7 the activities of these aligned physician practices, including the facilities, medical records and  
8 revenue.

9 12. Sutter Connect, LLC, doing business as Sutter Physician Services, is a single  
10 member limited liability company, of which Sutter is the sole member. Sutter Physician Services  
11 supports Sutter’s various medical foundations with services including third party administration,  
12 physician billing and managed care management, financial management reporting and provider  
13 relations.

14 13. The Sutter Medical Network is the network of doctors at Sutter’s affiliated  
15 hospitals and foundations. The Sutter Medical Network has approximately 5,500 physicians  
16 across the Sutter-affiliated medical foundation corporations, the medical foundation corporations’  
17 exclusively contracted medical groups and independent practice associations of physicians.  
18 Sutter employs several programs that allow Sutter Medical Network’s members to connect into  
19 the Sutter medical record database where patients’ medical records are maintained.

20 14. Defendant PAMF is an affiliate of Sutter and is headquartered in Palo Alto.  
21 PAMF is a not-for-profit corporation with approximately 5,600 employees and locations across  
22 Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara and Santa Cruz counties. Sutter controls PAMF, including  
23 through overlapping corporate governance boards and executive officers. With regard to the  
24 PAMF fraud, Relator does not intend to pursue any claims other than those set forth in the  
25 Complaint in Intervention filed by the United States. *See* Dkt. 41. Relator nonetheless  
26 incorporates by reference the allegations in her original complaint with regard to the PAMF fraud.

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**JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

15. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this District Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this civil action since it arises under the laws of the United States, in particular, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 *et seq.* In addition, the FCA specifically confers jurisdiction upon the United States District Court. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).

16. This District Court has personal jurisdiction over Sutter pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) because the FCA authorizes nationwide service of process and Sutter has significant operations within this district.

17. Venue is likewise proper in this district pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) because Sutter transacts substantial business and resides in this judicial district.

**REGULATORY BACKGROUND**

**I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT**

18. The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863, over a century before Medicare or CMS came into being. It was passed by President Lincoln to combat widespread fraud by companies selling rancid food, ailing mules and defective weapons to the Union Army during the Civil War. From the outset, and through several amendments enacted over the past twenty-five years to increase the scope and reach of the statute, both Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly highlighted that (1) the False Claims Act is to be applied broadly and flexibly to reach all types of fraud that cause financial loss to the Government, and (2) private parties (relators) should be strongly encouraged to bring actions under the statute to supplement the Government’s limited resources to combat fraud.

19. When evaluating claims under the False Claims Act, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged and deferred to these twin goals of the statute and “consistently refused to accept a rigid, restrictive reading.” *United States v. Neifert-White Co.*, 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968). Instead, it has applied the law recognizing “Congress wrote [it] expansively, meaning to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Federal Government.” *Cook Cty. v. United States. ex rel. Chandler*, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). *See also Rainwater v. United States*, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958) (“It



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1 seems quite clear that the objective of Congress was broadly to protect the funds and property of  
 2 the Government. . .”); *Neifert-White*, 390 U.S. at 233 (the False Claims Act “reaches beyond  
 3 ‘claims’ which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to  
 4 pay out sums of money.”).

5 20. Likewise, “[e]ach time Congress has weighed in on the purpose and power of the  
 6 False Claims Act, it has endorsed a reading of that statute as a robust remedial measure aimed at  
 7 combatting fraud against the federal government as firmly as possible.” *United States ex rel.*  
 8 *Kane v. Healthfirst, Inc.*, 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The False Claims Act  
 9 together with its amendments “reflect Congress’s more than 150-year commitment to deterring  
 10 fraud against the federal government and ensuring that Government losses due to fraud are  
 11 recouped in a timely fashion.” *Id.*

12 21. The False Claims Act was amended in 1986 “to loosen restrictive judicial  
 13 interpretation of the Act’s liability standard and the burden of proof by defining previously  
 14 undefined terms, by expanding the *qui tam* jurisdictional provisions, and by increasing civil  
 15 penalties.” *United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustmante, P.A. v. Provident Life &*  
 16 *Accident Ins. Co.*, 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (citing 132 Cong. Rec. H6479-82  
 17 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986)). After determining that the “growing pervasiveness of fraud  
 18 necessitate[d] modernization of the Government’s primary litigative tool for combatting fraud,”  
 19 Congress amended the False Claims Act to “enhance the Government’s ability to recover losses  
 20 sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.” S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986), *as*  
 21 *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266, 5266. The “reverse false claims” provision of the FCA, 31  
 22 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G), was also added as part of these 1986 Amendments. *Id.* at 18. It is  
 23 called a “reverse” false claim “because the financial obligation that is the subject of the fraud  
 24 flows in the opposite of the usual direction.” *United States ex rel. Huangyan Imp. & Exp. Corp.*  
 25 *v. Nature’s Farm Prods., Inc.*, 370 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

26 22. The False Claims Act was amended again in 2009 to among other things define an  
 27 “obligation” to the Government to include the “retention of an overpayment.” 31 U.S.C.  
 28 § 3729(b)(3). Congress added this to make explicit that “*money or property that is knowingly*



1 retained by a person even though they have no right to it” is subject to False Claims Act liability.  
 2 S. Rep. No. 110-10, at 13-14 (2009), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441 (emphasis added).

3 23. A defendant violates the False Claims Act when it “knowingly presents, or causes  
 4 to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”; “knowingly makes, uses or  
 5 causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”; or  
 6 “knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an  
 7 obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or  
 8 knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property  
 9 to the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (G).

10 24. The terms “knowing” and “knowingly” include “actual knowledge of the  
 11 information,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or “reckless  
 12 disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” and “require no proof of specific intent  
 13 to defraud.” *Id.* § 3729(b)(1)(A), (B). With regard to the False Claims Act standard for  
 14 knowledge, the Ninth Circuit explained:

15 In defining knowingly, Congress attempted “to reach what has become known as  
 16 the ‘ostrich’ type situation where an individual has ‘buried his head in the sand’  
 17 and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert him that false claims are  
 18 being submitted.” S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 21 (1986), as reprinted in 1986  
 19 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5286. Congress adopted “the concept that individuals and  
 20 contractors receiving public funds have some duty to make a limited inquiry so as  
 21 to be reasonably certain they are entitled to the money they seek.” *Id.* at 20; see  
 22 also *id.* at 7 (discussing the importance of individual responsibility because the  
 23 government has limited resources to police fraud). “While the Committee intends  
 24 that at least some inquiry be made, the inquiry need only be ‘reasonable and  
 25 prudent under the circumstances.’” *Id.* at 21.

26 *United States v. Bourseau*, 531 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).

27 25. The term “claim” includes “(A) . . . any request or demand, whether under a  
 28 contract or otherwise, for money . . . that . . . (ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other  
 recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to  
 advance a Government program or interest, and if the United States Government—(I)  
 provides or has provided any portion of the money . . . requested or demanded; or (II) will  
 reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money which  
 is requested or demanded.” *Id.* § 3729(b)(2).

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1           26.     The term “material” is defined as “having a natural tendency to influence or  
 2 be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” *Id.* § 3729(b)(4).

3           27.     The term “obligation” is defined as “an established duty, whether or not fixed,  
 4 arising from an express or implied contractual ... relationship from a fee-based or similar  
 5 relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of an overpayment.” *Id.*  
 6 § 3729(b)(3). Even if an overpayment arises out of an innocent billing error or through a  
 7 mistake of the contractor, the obligation to return the overpayment still attaches.

8           28.     Consistent with the purpose of the False Claims Act to deter fraud and recoup the  
 9 Government’s losses in a timely fashion, Section 6402(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable  
 10 Care Act of 2010 (Enhanced Medicare and Medicaid Program Integrity Provisions), Pub. L. No.  
 11 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 753-56 (2010), amended the Social Security Act to add a new provision  
 12 that addresses what constitutes an overpayment under the False Claims Act in the context of a  
 13 federal healthcare program, like the Medicare Advantage Program at issue in this case. Social  
 14 Security Act (“SSA”) § 1128J(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d). Under this provision, an  
 15 overpayment is defined as “any funds that a person receives or retains under Title XVIII or XIX  
 16 to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.” *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-  
 17 7k(d)(4)(B). Congress directed that such overpayments could be enforced under the reverse false  
 18 claims provisions of the False Claims Act. *See* SSA § 1128J(d)(3). Congress also intended that  
 19 the remedies for knowingly retaining overpayments were to be broadly construed in favor of  
 20 those enforcement efforts, defining “knowing” and “knowingly” as expansively as under the  
 21 False Claims Act. *See* SSA § 1128J(d)(4)(B). To emphasize the importance of promptly  
 22 returning such overpayments Congress also provided that an “overpayment must be reported and  
 23 returned” within “60 days after the date on which the overpayment was identified.” *Id.* § 1320a-  
 24 7k(d)(2).

25           29.     “[S]ection 1128J(d) of the Act does not require the Secretary to issue regulations  
 26 for the statute to be effective, and the statute’s requirements are in effect in the absence of  
 27 regulation. Providers ... that identify overpayments received from Medicare or Medicaid should  
 28 report and return those overpayments to the appropriate payor as required by section 1128J(d) of

1 the Act.” *Medicare Final Rule Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, Parts A and B*, 81  
 2 Fed. Reg. 7654, 7655 (Feb. 12, 2016); *see also Medicare Proposed Rule Reporting and Returning*  
 3 *of Overpayments Part C*, 79 Fed Reg. 1918, 1995 (Jan 2014) (even in the absence of final  
 4 regulations implementing changes to the Social Security Act, providers are required to adhere to  
 5 the law and face potential FCA liability for failing to report and return any overpayment).

## 6 II. THE MEDICARE PROGRAM

7 30. Medicare is a healthcare benefit program funded by the federal government. The  
 8 Medicare program compensates participating doctors, hospitals and other healthcare providers  
 9 who furnish healthcare services to citizens of the United States (and certain other legal residents)  
 10 who have reached the age of 65 or who suffer from certain qualifying disabilities. Medicare was  
 11 established by Title XVIII of the Social Security Act of 1965 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
 12 § 1395 *et. seq.*).

13 31. The agency of the United States responsible for the Medicare program is the  
 14 Department of Health and Human Services. *See, e.g.*, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-1, 1395b-2, 1395b-3,  
 15 1395b-4, 1395b-7, 1395r and 1395u. CMS is the agency within HHS administering the program.

### 16 A. Traditional Medicare

17 32. CMS administers the hospital insurance benefits program, commonly referred to as  
 18 “Medicare Part A.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-5. Medicare Part A “provides basic protection  
 19 against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care.” 42  
 20 U.S.C. § 1395c.

21 33. CMS also administers Medicare Part B, a 100% federally subsidized health  
 22 insurance benefit. Eligible persons aged 65 or older may enroll in Part B to obtain benefits in  
 23 return for payments of monthly premiums as established by HHS. The benefits covered by Part B  
 24 include physician, hospital, outpatient and ancillary services and durable medical equipment.

25 34. “Traditional Medicare uses a fee-for-service payment model, whereby the more  
 26 services physicians perform, the more money they earn. After Medicare was enacted, however,  
 27 experts came to realize that this payment structure encourages healthcare providers to order more  
 28 tests and procedures than medically necessary.” *Silingo*, 904 F.3d at 672. Congress, therefore,

1 authorized a new program that would address these known problems in traditional Medicare. The  
2 result was Medicare Part C beginning in 1997.

### 3 **B. The Medicare Advantage Program – Part C**

4 35. Medicare Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage, authorizes qualified  
5 individuals to opt out of traditional fee-for-service coverage under Medicare Parts A and B and  
6 enroll in privately-run managed care plans that provide coverage for both inpatient and outpatient  
7 services. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21, 1395w-28. “Medicare Advantage seeks to improve the  
8 quality of care while safeguarding the public fisc by employing a ‘capitation’ payment system.”  
9 *Silingo*, 904 F.3d at 672.

10 36. Unlike the traditional fee-for-service model where the provider bills for services  
11 rendered, in the Medicare Advantage Program CMS pays for the care of enrollees in advance  
12 using a monthly “capitation” amount for each beneficiary. “The capitated amount is a fixed  
13 monthly payment regardless of the volume of services an enrollee uses.” *United States ex rel.*  
14 *Swoben v. United Healthcare Ins. Co.*, 848 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016).

#### 15 **1. Sutter’s Role as a Medicare Advantage Provider**

16 37. Medicare Part C allows private health insurance companies to administer Medicare  
17 benefits on behalf of the United States. These MAOs offer Medicare eligible beneficiaries a  
18 variety of Medicare Advantage plans. Medicare beneficiaries join an MAO plan and pay monthly  
19 premiums and copayments that are often less than the coinsurance and deductibles under  
20 traditional Medicare.

21 38. The MAOs may enter into contracts with providers like Sutter to provide  
22 healthcare services for enrollees on behalf of the MAO. “All contracts or written agreements  
23 [between MAOs and providers] must specify that the related entity, contractor, or subcontractor  
24 must comply with all applicable Medicare laws, regulations, and CMS instructions.” 42 C.F.R.  
25 § 422.504(i)(4)(v).

26 39. Sutter contracts with three MAOs: Health Net, Inc.; Humana, Inc.; and  
27 UnitedHealth Group Inc. (“UnitedHealth”), which offer healthcare through Sutter to Medicare  
28 beneficiaries enrolled in the MAOs’ Medicare Advantage plans. Sutter provides healthcare

1 through ten Medicare Advantage plans to approximately 50,000 Medicare beneficiaries for whom  
 2 CMS pays hundreds of millions of dollars in capitation payments each year. As of March 2015,  
 3 Sutter broke down its Medicare Advantage population by affiliate as follows:

Affiliate	Covered Lives	% of Total MA Population
Palo Alto Medical Foundation	8,451	16.82%
Palo Alto Medical Foundation- Mills Peninsula Division/Mills Peninsula Medical Group	4,719	9.39%
Sutter East Bay Medical Foundation	2,984	5.94%
Sutter Pacific Medical Foundation	2,530	5.04%
Sutter Medical Foundation	14,975	29.81%
Sutter Gould Medical Foundation	7,793	15.51%
Sutter Independent Physicians	6,418	12.78%
Central Valley Medical Group	2,367	4.71%
<b>Sutter Medical Network 2015</b>	<b>50,237</b>	<b>100%</b>

## 2. The Critical Role of Risk Adjustment

40. In Medicare Part C, the Government pays to each MAO a fixed, monthly capitated amount for each beneficiary, adjusted by the expected risk of each beneficiary, for the provision of items and services covered for Medicare beneficiaries under Parts A and B. This per-member, per-month payment does not depend on the amount of healthcare services actually provided. Each year this payment is based on a bidding process with CMS, in which each MAO submits a bid amount, which is then compared to an administratively set benchmark set by CMS based on a statutory formula. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23; *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 422.2, subparts F and G. Since 2000, Congress has required that the capitated payments be adjusted based on (1) each

1 enrollee’s demographic factors such as age and gender, among others, and (2) each enrollee’s  
2 health status. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (a)(1)(C). This is known as risk adjustment, and the  
3 RAF-based risk score acts as a multiplier that is applied to the MAO’s bid for covering Part A  
4 and B services. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (a)(1)(G); 42 C.F.R. § 422.308(e). The purpose of  
5 risk adjustment is to “allow[] CMS to pay plans for the risk of the beneficiaries they enroll” and  
6 to “make appropriate and accurate payments for enrollees with differences in expected costs.”  
7 CMS, *Medicare Managed Care Manual*, Ch. 7, § 20 (rev. 118, September 19, 2014).

8 41. The Secretary of HHS has the authority to determine the risk adjustment  
9 methodology. *See id.* Since 2004, CMS has employed an HCC model to calculate a risk score  
10 for each beneficiary in a Medicare Advantage plan. As directed by Congress, the HCC model  
11 takes into account demographic factors and health status. With respect to health status, the HCC  
12 model relies on diagnosis codes documented by authorized healthcare providers, *e.g.*, physicians  
13 in patient encounters during office visits and hospital outpatient and inpatient stays. Diagnoses  
14 are the sole determinant in the calculation of any risk-adjustment payment based on a  
15 beneficiary’s health status.

16 42. The International Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) codes set forth the standards  
17 accepted by CMS and the healthcare industry for the identification of patient diagnoses by their  
18 physicians. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 162.1002(a)(1)(i), (b)(1), (c)(2)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 422.310(d)(1); CMS,  
19 *Medicare Managed Care Manual*, Ch. 7, Exhibit 30 (rev. 57, August 13, 2004). ICD codes are  
20 alphanumeric codes used by the healthcare providers, insurance companies and public health  
21 agencies to represent diagnoses. Every disease, injury, infection and symptom has its own code.  
22 The applicable standards for these ICD diagnosis codes are set forth in the International  
23 Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (“ICD-9”) through October 1,  
24 2015, and thereafter the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical  
25 Modification (“ICD-10”). To ensure accuracy, the patient diagnoses must result from a face-to-  
26 face encounter between the physician and patient during the relevant year and must be  
27 appropriately documented in the patient’s medical record at the time of the encounter. *See*  
28 *Silingo*, 904 F.3d at 673 (“Every diagnosis code submitted to CMS must be based on a ‘face-to-

1 face' visit that is documented in the medical record.”). In addition, codes should be based on  
2 documented conditions that require or affect patient care, treatment or management. *See CMS,*  
3 *Medicare Managed Care Manual*, Ch. 7, § 111.8 (rev. 47, February 20, 2004); *CMS, 2008 Risk*  
4 *Adjustment Data Technical Assistance for Medicare Advantage Organizations Participant Guide*,  
5 § 7.1.5.

6 43. HCCs are categories of clinically-related medical diagnoses including major,  
7 severe, and/or chronic illnesses. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 422.2. Each HCC correlates with the marginal  
8 predicted cost of medical expenditures for that set of medical conditions based on CMS's data  
9 from administering the traditional Medicare Parts A and B fee-for-service program. Higher  
10 relative values (sometimes referred to as a relative factor, multiplier, or coefficient) are assigned  
11 to HCCs that include diagnoses with greater disease severity and treatment costs. Between 2004  
12 and 2013, there were 70 HCCs in the Part C risk adjustment model, and starting in 2014 that  
13 number increased to 79, as CMS revised its risk adjustment model. A single beneficiary may  
14 have none, one, or multiple HCCs. Some examples of HCC codes are HIV/AIDS (HCC 1),  
15 metastatic cancer and leukemia (HCC 8), congestive heart failure (HCC 80), and ischemic stroke  
16 (HCC 100). HCC numerical codes changed between the 2004-13 model (known as Version 12)  
17 and the 2014 model (known as Version 22). The numerical examples of HCC codes cited herein  
18 are from the Version 22 model.

19 44. The HCC model is prospective, meaning it relies on risk-adjusting diagnosis codes  
20 from dates of service by a provider in one year (the “date of service year”) to determine payments  
21 in the subsequent year (the “payment year”). Each Medicare Advantage plan beneficiary's risk  
22 score is calculated anew for the subsequent year. The higher a beneficiary's risk score, the higher  
23 the Medicare payments to the MAO and the provider. The MAO distributes a contractually-  
24 determined percentage of these payments to providers such as Sutter. Thus, the risk-adjusting  
25 diagnosis codes that map to the HCC codes Sutter submits materially impact the amount of the  
26 Medicare payments to the MAO, and therefore, to Sutter.

27 45. Illustrating this process as pertinent to Sutter, generally after a face-to-face  
28 encounter between a physician and an MAO plan patient the provider (generally the physician



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1 and/or coder) (1) documents the encounter in the patient’s electronic medical record, (2) assigns  
 2 the diagnoses reflecting the patient’s medical conditions and corresponding ICD codes, and (3)  
 3 adds those diagnosis codes into Sutter’s electronic records system. The diagnosis codes are  
 4 transmitted electronically to the MAO through either an electronic data submission after a patient  
 5 encounter or through a monthly process in the electronic records system known at Sutter as  
 6 “sweeping” or “sweeps.” Sutter Physician Services Senior Business Analyst, Michael Aguilar,  
 7 confirmed to Relator that “[f]or all the Sutter Foundations [Sutter Physician Services] is sending  
 8 diagnostic code records linked to patient encounters out of the [electronic medical record system]  
 9 . . . every month.” In turn, the MAOs then electronically submit these codes to CMS. CMS maps  
 10 each beneficiary’s diagnosis codes to HCCs (*i.e.*, the risk-adjusting diagnosis codes), and then  
 11 calculates each beneficiary’s risk score to apply to the payment calculation and determine the  
 12 reimbursement. For example, with regard to UnitedHealth Sutter summarizes the encounter data  
 13 submission pathway as follows: Sutter Affiliate → Sutter Physician Services → Clearinghouse →  
 14 MAOs → Optum, a UnitedHealth affiliate → CMS.

15 46. Regulations and guidance make clear to MAOs and providers such as Sutter that  
 16 CMS relies on the risk-adjusting diagnosis codes submitted by providers to determine and make  
 17 accurate capitation payments for each patient enrolled in the Part C program. “Accurate risk-  
 18 adjusted payments rely on the diagnosis coding derived from the member’s medical record.” *See*,  
 19 *e.g.*, 42 C.F.R. § 422.504(1)(3); CMS, *2013 National Technical Assistance Risk Adjustment 101*  
 20 *Participant Guide*, 13.

21 47. The Ninth Circuit also confirmed CMS’s risk adjustment methodology for Part C  
 22 relies on diagnosis codes supported by a properly documented medical record, stating:

23 [CMS] adjusts the monthly payments to Medicare Advantage organizations to  
 24 reflect the health status of their enrollees. This ensures Medicare Advantage  
 25 organizations are paid appropriately for their plan enrollees (that is, less for  
 26 healthier enrollees and more for less healthy enrollees). The risk adjustment  
 27 methodology relies on enrollee diagnoses. Physicians and other health care  
 providers submit diagnosis codes to the Medicare Advantage organizations, which  
 in turn submit them to CMS. These diagnosis codes contribute to an enrollee’s  
 risk score, which is used to adjust a base payment rate. Each diagnosis code  
 submitted must be supported by a properly documented medical record.

28 *Swoben*, 848 F.3d at 1167-68 (internal citations omitted).

1 48. MAOs can delete diagnoses from the encounter data submission pathway  
 2 including through the Risk-Adjusting Processing System (“RAPS”) and Encounter Data System  
 3 (“EDS”) to comply with their obligation to delete known erroneous, invalid, unsupported or  
 4 otherwise false diagnosis codes previously submitted to CMS. Similarly, Sutter also has an  
 5 obligation to delete these false codes in its systems. Doing so should cause the MAOs to delete  
 6 those codes in the RAPS system, and thereby cause CMS to adjust the RAF score for the patient  
 7 downward and the capitated payment downward as well.

### 8 3. Medicare Advantage Payments are subject to the False Claims Act

9 49. “The Medicare Advantage capitation payment system is subject to the False  
 10 Claims Act.” *Silingo*, 904 F.3d at 673.

11 50. Upon learning of a false diagnosis code resulting in a Medicare Advantage  
 12 overpayment from CMS, healthcare providers such as Sutter must delete or otherwise withdraw  
 13 that code. *See Swoben*, 848 F.3d at 1176-77 & n.8. They must also refund any overpayment  
 14 received as a result of the false code. The failure to delete or withdraw known false codes is the  
 15 knowing retention of an overpayment in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). Likewise, a  
 16 failure or refusal to delete or withdraw known false codes is the submission, or causes the  
 17 submission, of false claims in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B).

## 18 THE SUTTER-WIDE FRAUD

### 19 I. RELATOR’S EXPERIENCE IN RISK ADJUSTMENT

20 51. Relator has been a professional medical coder for twenty-five years. In 2004, she  
 21 became a Certified Professional Coder with the American Association of Professional Coders  
 22 (“AAPC”). The AAPC’s Certified Professional Coder credential is the gold standard for medical  
 23 coding in physician office settings. “[Certified Professional Coders] have proven mastery of all  
 24 code sets [including ICD-10] . . . and adherence to documentation and coding guidelines.  
 25 [Certified Professional Coders] represent excellence in medical coding.”  
 26 <https://www.aapc.com/certification/cpc.aspx> (last visited April 2, 2019).

27 52. Because medical coding is a core Health Information Management function,  
 28 Relator is also a member of the American Health Information Management Association

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1 (“AHIMA”). According to the AHIMA Standards of Ethical Coding, coding professionals should  
 2 “[r]efuse to participate in or support coding or documentation practices intended to  
 3 inappropriately increase payment, qualify for insurance policy coverage, or skew data by means  
 4 that do not comply with federal and state statutes, regulations and official rules and guidelines.”  
 5 <http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/AHIMA%202008.pdf> (last visited April 2, 2019).

6 53. Together AHIMA and AAPC represent the industry standard for medical coding.  
 7 Relator regularly cited to these standards in training materials she developed. Sutter also knew of  
 8 and cited to AHIMA’s Ethics Standards for medical coding in materials it provided to RAF  
 9 coders. “AHIMA Standards of Ethical Coding [] direct coders to ‘assign and report only the  
 10 codes and data that are clearly and consistently supported by health record documentation in  
 11 accordance with applicable code set and abstraction conventions, rules, and guidelines.’”

12 54. Prior to joining Sutter, Relator worked as a Data Quality Trainer for risk  
 13 adjustment for another Medicare Advantage provider. In that position, Relator gained a deep  
 14 understanding of how the RAF component of the Medicare Advantage Program is supposed to  
 15 work and the duties healthcare providers like Sutter have under the program. Indeed, since  
 16 Relator started in that position in 2007, the same year CMS fully implemented its risk adjustment  
 17 model, Relator has been working in this specialized coding area from the beginning.

18 55. In 2013, Relator accepted a position at Sutter’s PAMF affiliate to support its  
 19 Medicare Advantage Program. From that position, Relator observed first-hand the Sutter-wide  
 20 fraud on which this action is based.

21 **II. SUTTER’S UNDERSTANDING OF PART C REIMBURSEMENT AND ITS**  
 22 **OBLIGATIONS AS A MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROVIDER**

23 56. On May 6, 2013, Relator reported for her first day of work at PAMF’s Sunnyvale,  
 24 California office. Suzy Cliff, PAMF’s Vice President of Revenue Cycle, handled Relator’s  
 25 orientation. Cliff told Relator that PAMF had “nothing” in place for risk adjustment.  
 26 Subsequently, Julie Cheung, Sutter’s RAF Program Manager, confirmed that even though  
 27 Medicare Advantage Programs using RAF started at Sutter in 2010, there was no support for the  
 28 Program Sutter-wide until 2012. As discussed below, the “support” for RAF Sutter introduced in

1 2012 was Sutter's organized efforts to increase its RAF scores -- not any attempt to develop a  
2 compliant RAF program with accurate coding to support reimbursement.

3 57. During orientation, Cliff reviewed with Relator the contents of a three-ring binder  
4 she had also used in Relator's interview months before. The first page in Cliff's binder was a  
5 November 2012 report showing Sutter's goal was to raise the PAMF RAF score by 28%. The  
6 report also included a snapshot of a "Trend Report by Affiliate" showing the RAF score trend for  
7 each of Sutter's five affiliates: PAMF, Sutter East Bay, Sutter Pacific, Sutter Gould and Sutter  
8 Medical.

9 58. Cliff's binder also included summary reports on the RAF program at each affiliate  
10 in a format called "RAF Dashboards," which provided metrics on the RAF score trends in each of  
11 the affiliates. The reports in Cliff's binder also summarized prevalence rates for different  
12 diagnoses. The prevalence rate referred to the number of cases of a specific HCC in the State of  
13 California's Medicare Advantage population compared to each affiliate's capture of that HCC in  
14 physician encounters at Sutter. If an affiliate's capture of that HCC was below the state average,  
15 Sutter viewed it as an indicator of a lost revenue opportunity. The HCCs Sutter focused on varied  
16 from year to year but typically included the ones with high reimbursement such as chronic  
17 obstructive pulmonary disease (HCC 111), diabetes with manifestation (HCC 18), congestive  
18 heart failure (HCC 85), major depressive disorder (HCC 58), and peripheral vascular disease  
19 (HCC 108).

20 59. When Cliff left Relator at the end of her orientation she took the binder with her.  
21 Relator was otherwise left in an empty cubicle.

22 60. Though not among the materials in Cliff's binder, Relator eventually found  
23 Sutter's Policy for "Overpayment Refund. 13-540." It provided Sutter's understanding of its  
24 obligation under the Social Security Act, as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable  
25 Care Act, to timely report and refund any Medicare overpayments resulting from inaccurate or  
26 improper coding and take steps to prevent any overpayments from recurring:

27 ///

28 ///

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1 SCOPE

2 This policy applies to Sutter Health, its Affiliated Entities and Operating  
 Corporations.

3 POLICY

4 Sutter Health and its Affiliates will report and refund overpayments from state  
 and federal healthcare programs within 60 days of identification, or the due date  
 5 for any applicable reconciliation. As appropriate, Sutter Health and its affiliates  
 will take remedial steps to prevent identified overpayments from recurring.

6 PURPOSE

7 The purpose of this policy is to establish the date(s) for identification of  
 overpayments and the process for timely reporting and return of identified  
 8 overpayments as required by Section 6402 of the Patient Protection and  
 Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).

9 DEFINITIONS

10 \*\*\*

11 C. Overpayment – is the amount of money Sutter Health or a Sutter Health  
 affiliate has received in excess of the amount due and payable under any state  
 12 or federal health care program requirements. Overpayments include, but are  
 not limited to, finding of incorrect code or modifier assignment resulting in a  
 13 higher level of reimbursement... or any other finding that reflects an  
 overpayment was received as a result of inaccurate or improper coding or  
 14 reporting of health care items or services.

15 61. Relator and others throughout Sutter including Julie Cheung and Roger Larsen,  
 16 Sutter Regional Vice President of Finance and PAMF CFO, regularly received updated RAF  
 17 Dashboards and other RAF trend analyses like the ones in Cliff’s binder as part of the Sutter-wide  
 18 effort to raise RAF scores. For example, on June 10, 2013, Cliff forwarded Relator an email from  
 19 Jeffrey Burnich, Sutter Senior Vice President and Executive Officer, with the subject “RAF  
 20 Quarterly Report,” which showed the Sutter-wide progress towards increasing RAF scores across  
 21 all affiliates. It also reflected Sutter’s understanding that CMS-generated RAF scores are based  
 22 on the documentation Sutter includes in the patient’s medical record. Dr. Burnich explained that  
 23 Sutter Medical Network:

24 is pleased to support you with the latest quality data report to track progress on  
 the Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) project. RAF is the Centers for Medicare and  
 25 Medicaid’s (CMS) assignment of a complexity score to a Medicare Advantage  
 patient. This is based on the documentation and coding intensity of the patient’s  
 26 medical condition and patient demographics.

27 The attached presentation shows the progress towards improving the [Sutter  
 28 Medical Network’s] RAF score.

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1           62. Relator also regularly received Medicare Advantage Performance (MAP) Reports,  
 2 which like the dashboards provided information on Sutter’s progress in increasing RAF scores.  
 3 For example, a January 2015 MAP Report, subtitled “Progress Toward Improved Acuity  
 4 Reporting,” provided an overview of the Medicare Advantage Program and again Sutter’s  
 5 understanding of its obligation to provide accurate coding information to obtain appropriate  
 6 reimbursement:

7           Under CMS’ prospective, risk-adjusted payment model, the health status of the  
 8 [MA] patient population must be accurately reflected in order to obtain  
 9 appropriate revenue to cover the costs of care. The acuity of our Medicare  
 10 Advantage population is represented as the hierarchical condition category (HCC)  
 11 score which reflects how well we assess, diagnose, document, code and report  
 12 select acute and chronic conditions. The HCC is the clinical component of the  
 13 total Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) score.

14           \*\*\*

15           To support improvement in acuity reporting, Sutter Medical Network, in  
 16 collaboration with the affiliates, identified a series of target conditions and  
 17 activities to promote the annual, comprehensive review of health status, thorough  
 18 documentation, and accurate coding of clinically diagnosed conditions.

19           63. Like the RAF Dashboards, the MAP Report provided a “System Overview”  
 20 including (1) Medicare Advantage population by affiliate; (2) performance metrics for Annual  
 21 Wellness Visits by affiliate; (3) year over year HCC scores by affiliate as reported by CMS with  
 22 comparison to statewide averages; and (4) CMS’s reported HCC score for each affiliate over  
 23 time. The MAP Report also included dashboard summaries for each affiliate separately. Early  
 24 MAP reports and quarterly RAF dashboards were maintained on the Sutter Medical Network  
 25 RAF Program portal (“RAF portal”). Sutter was constantly monitoring and making adjustments  
 26 to “maximize outcomes for HCC capture and reporting” to achieve its stated goals for increased  
 27 RAF scores.

28           64. Although Relator was primarily supporting PAMF’s RAF program, the Sutter-  
 wide effort to increase RAF scores required her to constantly engage with Sutter management and  
 her RAF program counterparts at the other Sutter affiliates. Not only did Relator routinely  
 interact with Sutter management and her RAF counterparts, but given Relator’s substantial RAF  
 experience, she frequently provided them information on the critical role of risk-adjustment and



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1 diagnosis codes in the Medicare Advantage Program. Julie Cheung, who was responsible for  
 2 overseeing the RAF program at all five Sutter affiliates, was especially excited to hear any of  
 3 Relator’s ideas regarding risk adjustment given her own lack of experience in the area. Indeed,  
 4 even though she had responsibility for the Sutter-wide RAF program, Cheung confided to Relator  
 5 when they first spoke that she did not know what RAF was when she applied for the job  
 6 overseeing the Sutter-wide RAF program and had to “google” it.

7 65. One example of the type of information Relator provided Cheung is a December  
 8 2013 PAMF RAF Implementation plan Relator prepared describing the importance of accurate  
 9 physician coding:

10 Medicare Advantage plans rely entirely on the Hierarchical Condition Category  
 11 for reimbursement. Because of this, it is essential for Medicare Advantage plans  
 12 to ensure providers capture the complete diagnostic profile of every Medicare  
 13 Advantage patient ... Medicare Advantage plans must capture HCC conditions  
 14 annually. When documentation does not support the chronic condition(s), and no  
 15 identification of HCCs has taken place, no reimbursement will be collected from  
 16 Medicare.

17 66. In another instance, Relator’s team at PAMF created a clinical documentation  
 18 training video on the transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10 coding. They provided the video to  
 19 Cheung and Relator’s RAF counterparts at the other affiliates to facilitate proper training on the  
 20 new ICD-10 guidelines which would directly impact diagnostic coding that mapped to HCCs in  
 21 all Sutter’s affiliates.

22 67. Based on Relator’s first-hand experience with the Sutter-wide RAF program,  
 23 Sutter understood its obligation to provide accurate risk adjustment information and the critical  
 24 role this information plays in CMS’s calculations of appropriate reimbursement under the  
 25 Medicare Advantage Program. Sutter understood:

- 26 • How CMS calculated risk scores.
- 27 • CMS’s HCC model incorporated new information, including updates to the ICD  
 28 standards for coding.
- The role of ICD diagnosis codes to RAF Coding, including the transition to ICD-  
 10.



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- 1           • The importance of correctly mapping ICD-9, and then ICD-10, diagnosis codes to
- 2           CMS's HCC model.
- 3           • Capture of HCCs was the clinical component essential to the calculation of the risk
- 4           adjustment score used to calculate reimbursement.
- 5           • There was a direct relationship between higher risk scores and higher payments.
- 6           • When documentation does not support a diagnosis of a chronic condition(s), and
- 7           no identification of HCCs has taken place, no increased reimbursement will be
- 8           collected from Medicare.
- 9           • The health status of the [Medicare Advantage] patient population must be
- 10          accurately reflected in a properly documented medical record in order to obtain
- 11          appropriate reimbursement.
- 12          • Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, Sutter had a duty to refund overpayments,
- 13          including those identified from incorrect, inaccurate or unsupported coding, and
- 14          failing to do so would result in False Claims Act liability.

### 15           **III. SUTTER'S CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE RAF REVENUE ACROSS ALL**

### 16           **AFFILIATES**

17           68. PAMF's goal in hiring Relator in 2013 was to raise PAMF's RAF score by 28% as

18           part of the Sutter-wide effort to increase RAF scores across all affiliates. As described in a

19           January 2015 Sutter MAP report, to achieve these increased RAF scores, Sutter instituted in

20           January 2013 a system-wide goal to raise the average HCC more than 30% by July 2014. Sutter's

21           objective was to bring its RAF scores above the statewide average (with associated increase in

22           revenue) regardless of the actual medical condition of its Medicare Advantage population. The

23           Sutter-wide measures to accomplish these goals included: (1) increasing the rate of Annual

24           Wellness Visits for Medicare Advantage patients, thereby increasing the opportunity to capture

25           more HCC codes in a required face-to-face encounter with a physician; (2) recapturing HCCs

26           each year to ensure no decrease in reimbursement rates upon CMS's annual rate reset; (3)

27           tracking prevalence rates for those high-value HCCs where Sutter was below the statewide

28

1 average; and (4) tracking Year-to-Date HCC Score Average Build-Up which allowed Sutter to  
2 monitor and take action to ensure no downward trend in a patient's HCC score.

3 69. Relator soon understood that Sutter viewed RAF as a revenue stream with little to  
4 no consideration for whether the diagnosis codes that led to the RAF reimbursement were  
5 properly supported in the patient's medical record.

6 70. Sutter relied on individuals like Relator supporting RAF and "Physician  
7 Champions" at each affiliate to implement management's objectives to increase RAF scores  
8 Sutter-wide.

9 71. In Relator's first week at PAMF in May 2013, she was introduced to Dr. Veko  
10 Vahamaki, the lead Physician Champion at PAMF. Thereafter, Relator and Dr. Vahamaki met  
11 weekly to discuss what each of them was doing as part of the RAF program. Relator also  
12 regularly interacted with PAMF's other Physician Champions: Dr. Amy Lin, Dr. Graham  
13 Dresden, Dr. Anita Gupta, and Dr. Susan Schaefer. Dr. Susan Pertsch subsequently joined the  
14 group of PAMF Physician Champions.

15 72. Sutter appointed Physician Champions at each affiliate and paid them to train the  
16 primary care physicians largely responsible for the diagnostic coding during patient "encounters"  
17 or visits. Among other things, the Physician Champions were supposed to be models of accurate  
18 diagnostic coding and were responsible for communicating the importance of diagnostic coding  
19 to other physicians. With hundreds of primary care physicians in each affiliate, Sutter only paid  
20 the Physician Champions for roughly one day a week, leaving only minutes per physician to do  
21 one-on-one mentoring. Physician Champions had no experience or training in RAF coding and  
22 were not certified coders. The Physician Champions at PAMF and the other Sutter affiliates  
23 spent most of their time going to meetings where they would promote Sutter's strategy of  
24 increasing RAF scores and implementing the plan themselves by reviewing patient medical  
25 records for lost opportunities to capture additional HCCs (but not to ensure the diagnostic codes  
26 that mapped to the HCCs reported were adequately supported in the patient records). The one-  
27 on-one physician meetings they did arrange were largely attempts to overcome the objections of  
28 physicians who resisted being trained on how to increase RAF scores. After prioritizing these

1 revenue-generating activities, there was little, if any, time for actual one-on-one training on  
2 accurate RAF coding.

3 73. From the beginning, Relator witnessed Sutter's tightly organized corporate  
4 campaign to increase RAF scores. This system-wide effort was run from the top by Sutter RAF  
5 Program Director Nancy McGinnis, Sutter RAF Project Manager Julie Cheung, Sutter's  
6 RAF/HCC Lead Coder Jessica Driver-Zuniga, who reported to Cheung, and Sutter Senior Vice  
7 President and Executive Officer Jeff Burnich. Cheung, the Program Manager with no RAF  
8 experience, or Driver-Zuniga ran meetings and reported back to McGinnis. Burnich was kept  
9 informed of the challenges and successes at the affiliates in implementing Sutter's RAF campaign  
10 so that in Burnich's words, his group could support Sutter's "progress towards improving the  
11 [Sutter Medical Network]'s RAF score." Relator also saw that Sutter Vice President of Finance  
12 Larsen closely monitored progress through the MAP reports and RAF dashboards.

13 74. In his role as a Physician Champion, Dr. Vahamaki attended regular Sutter-wide  
14 conference calls and meetings at Sutter's Green Valley, California property. For example, Sutter-  
15 wide Physician Champion meetings were held on at least the following dates: August 22, 2014,  
16 November 14, 2015, and February 11, 2015. The purpose of these meetings was to allow the  
17 Physician Champions to exchange information on what each affiliate was doing towards the  
18 Sutter-wide goal to raise RAF scores.

19 75. Relator participated in Sutter's RAF Coder User Group which was made up of  
20 individuals at all Sutter affiliates doing similar jobs ostensibly supporting Sutter's RAF program.  
21 The RAF Coder User Group operated under the direction of Cheung (who was not a certified  
22 coder and had no training in medical coding, let alone RAF coding) and Driver-Zuniga. Many of  
23 Sutter's RAF Coder User Group, like the Physician Champions and Cheung, were not certified  
24 coders and had no RAF coding experience.

25 76. The RAF Coder User Group held monthly calls over WebEx and, like the  
26 Physician Champions, met quarterly at Green Valley. Relator began attending RAF Coder User  
27 Group meetings in 2013. The Group held regular calls or meetings on at least June 6, 2013, July  
28 11, 2013, August 16, 2013, October 28, 2013, December 5, 2013, February 24, 2014, December

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1 4, 2014, March 25, 2015, and April 23, 2015. The purpose of these regular calls and meetings  
2 was to keep the employees across Sutter’s affiliates who were supporting the Sutter-wide effort to  
3 increase RAF scores up to date on this Sutter-wide effort. The RAF Coder User Group members  
4 at each affiliate would share materials and strategies they were using to further the campaign.

5 77. In addition, Sutter created a working group called the “RAF Score Champions”  
6 which paired physicians like Dr. Vahamaki with an employee at each affiliate supporting the RAF  
7 program. The purpose of the RAF Score Champions was to encourage the pairs to work together  
8 to improve the RAF scores at each affiliate. Like the Physician Champions and the RAF Coder  
9 User Group, the RAF Score Champions met regularly to discuss ways they could increase  
10 Sutter’s RAF scores.

11 78. Since the purposes of all these meetings was to encourage affiliates to exchange  
12 strategies that were working to raise RAF scores at their respective locations, Sutter provided  
13 them tools to assure their success. For example, each meeting included time for a “Round Robin”  
14 type discussion where the Champions or RAF employees from each affiliate would share what  
15 they were doing to increase RAF. At one RAF Coder User Group meeting, for example, the  
16 Round Robin was subtitled “Proactive Coding Strategies.” Following these types of exchanges,  
17 Sutter would circulate successful strategies through the RAF portal so anyone supporting the RAF  
18 campaign had access to the tools each affiliate was using to raise the RAF scores.

19 79. At the same meeting where the coders discussed “Proactive Coding Strategies,”  
20 Dr. Vahamaki, then lead Champion Sutter-wide, coached coders on ways to overcome objections  
21 from physicians to the RAF score raising campaign. The objections collected in the advance  
22 materials included: “I don’t see the purpose of doing annual wellness visits. I know it doesn’t  
23 extend life” and “I know what RAF means – Revenue for Sutter at My Expense!” Overcoming  
24 physician objections was critical to encouraging action from the primary care physicians who  
25 Sutter needed to add multiple diagnoses that would ultimately increase the RAF scores.

26 80. Sutter made attendance at these quarterly Green Valley meetings mandatory and  
27 the meeting format consistently was driven towards the goal of raising RAF scores.  
28

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1           81. Sutter also provided anyone supporting the RAF campaign with regular reports,  
2 including MAP reports and RAF dashboards, comparing the scores for each affiliate  
3 benchmarked against the California average. At their meetings, Sutter directed Physician  
4 Champions and members of the RAF Coders User Group to attest to how these reports could be  
5 improved to add value for them.

6           82. During Relator's weekly meetings with Dr. Vahamaki, they would each report on  
7 their respective meetings or communications with other affiliates. If there were handouts from  
8 meetings the other did not have, including MAP reports or RAF dashboards, they would  
9 exchange them as part of their pairing as RAF Score Champions.

10           83. Relator repeatedly urged Sutter management, the Physician Champions and  
11 members of the RAF Coders Users Group to understand that Medicare required compliance, and  
12 that Sutter's single-minded focus on raising the RAF scores was not proper. Each affiliate had to  
13 have a compliant process in place for how it was conducting its RAF coding. Relator would  
14 describe what those practices were and how she was implementing them at PAMF. Sutter  
15 initially commended Relator for developing policies and procedures that could be of value Sutter-  
16 wide for Medicare compliance and for being a resource for "best practices" for all affiliates to  
17 follow. Nonetheless Sutter refused to undertake the very measures it both applauded and  
18 considered "best practices" to address the compliance obligations that came along with receiving  
19 more than \$400 million each year in Medicare Advantage capitation payments. Indeed, in  
20 contrast to all the effort and mandatory meetings focused on raising RAF scores, neither Sutter  
21 nor any of its affiliates held any meetings, let alone mandatory meetings or discussions, or created  
22 reports, tools or strategies, to ensure the accuracy of the RAF coding.

23           84. Sutter RAF Program Manager Cheung repeatedly confirmed that Relator was the  
24 only person at Sutter doing audits to evaluate whether the strategies Sutter was using to increase  
25 its RAF scores were generating unsupported diagnosis coding and resulting overpayments. As  
26 discussed below, Sutter ultimately shut down even those efforts so Sutter could single-mindedly  
27 concentrate on raising RAF revenue.

28

1           85.     Sutter’s RAF campaign succeeded. In just the two years from January 2013-  
 2 January 2015, Sutter increased its average HCC by 21% across all affiliates. In the one-year  
 3 period from January 2014-January 2015, Sutter had a system-wide increase of 25% in its RAF  
 4 score. When the preliminary numbers reporting an increase in scores from 2014-2015 were  
 5 circulated, Dr. Vahamaki forwarded them to Relator along with his excitement that the campaign  
 6 to increase RAF scores was producing results.

7           86.     Although Sutter’s RAF campaign succeeded in increasing RAF scores and Sutter’s  
 8 Part C reimbursement, Sutter continued to intentionally avoid taking any action to ensure the  
 9 coding supporting its hundreds of millions of dollars in Medicare reimbursement was accurate.  
 10 Sutter likewise failed to engage in any effort to identify overpayments it knew existed because of  
 11 improper coding. Sutter failed to take these steps even after Relator and other sources provided  
 12 actual evidence of false coding, known overpayments, and numerous red flags that Sutter’s RAF  
 13 coding across affiliates was inaccurate and resulted in Medicare reimbursement to which Sutter  
 14 was not entitled.

15           **IV. THE MAO AUDITS PROVIDED A RED FLAG TO SUTTER OF SYSTEM-WIDE**  
 16           **INACCURATE CODING AND OVERPAYMENTS**

17           87.     From Relator’s six years of RAF experience prior to PAMF, she understood and  
 18 expected that MAOs would periodically conduct audits and medical chart reviews to ensure  
 19 accurate risk adjustment coding.

20           88.     In February 2014 Sutter was notified by UnitedHealth, one of the MAOs Sutter  
 21 contracted with for healthcare to its Medicare Advantage plan participants, that a “Risk  
 22 Adjustment Data Validation” (RADV) audit was being conducted on a sampling of Sutter patients  
 23 for 2010 dates of service. UnitedHealth stated that: “[f]or the first time with this 2011 RADV  
 24 audit, the CMS will apply the results of the audit to the revenue for all members on the contract,  
 25 not just the ones in the audit sample. As a result, any payment adjustment will be applied to the  
 26 entire member population rather than just those in the audit sample.” As UnitedHealth explained  
 27 in another communication surrounding the RADV Audit: “The purpose of this request is to  
 28

1 validate diagnoses that were sent to CMS for determining health status adjusted payments under  
2 risk adjustment.”

3 89. As requested by UnitedHealth, Relator pulled the medical records for a PAMF  
4 patient in the audit, Patient A. In the process, Relator conducted her own assessment and found  
5 no documentation in the patient’s medical record to support the HCC for “malignant neo.  
6 Prostate” which Sutter had submitted as part of its claim for reimbursement for the care of this  
7 patient. Relator understood that Patient A would thus be a RADV audit failure since there was  
8 insufficient documentation to validate the medical condition of malignant prostate cancer with a  
9 2010 date of service. The audit failure would also require the diagnosis to be deleted and a refund  
10 made to CMS for overpayment for the care of Patient A.

11 90. Relator spoke several times to Lynn Moura, RAF Project Lead/Health Records  
12 Analyst, PAMF, Mills Division and another member of the RAF Coder User Group, about this  
13 RADV audit. Moura had two patients in the RADV audit and she told Relator that at least one of  
14 the audited patients failed for lack of supporting documentation for myocardial infarction. Moura  
15 also reported that there were other RADV audit failures at other Sutter affiliates. Concerned for  
16 the potential implication of Patient A’s audit failure to PAMF, Relator reviewed the records of  
17 another PAMF patient in the RADV audit who had an HCC for active stroke. This patient failed  
18 too as there was no documentation in the medical records supporting a diagnosis of active stroke  
19 for 2010 dates of service.

20 91. In early March 2014 Relator spoke to Sutter RAF Program Manager Cheung about  
21 the RADV audit. Relator reviewed the PAMF and Mills results with Cheung and impressed upon  
22 her that these failures in cancer, stroke and myocardial infarction were a snapshot of Sutter’s  
23 inaccurate RAF coding Sutter-wide. Relator stressed the need for Sutter to conduct its own audit  
24 or take other remedial steps to assess the full scope of Sutter’s false coding and the resulting  
25 Medicare overpayments for dates of service starting in 2010, and to ensure accurate coding and  
26 appropriate Medicare reimbursement in the future. This was not a PAMF-only problem. Cheung  
27 admitted to Relator that the invalid and unsupported HCC coding was happening Sutter-wide,  
28 telling her PAMF was not “unique.”



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1           92. Relator also explained to Cheung what the potential liability could be if the audit  
2 failures were extrapolated across the patient population. Cheung expressed grave concern at the  
3 amount of money (millions of dollars) Sutter could be made to repay.

4           93. During this conversation, Relator also let Cheung know that she had forwarded the  
5 medical records of the audited patients as UnitedHealth requested.

6           94. A few days later, Sutter held a mandatory RAF Coder User Group WebEx call to  
7 discuss the RADV audit. Representatives from all affiliates and Cheung were in attendance.  
8 Relator, Moura and group members from the other affiliates all reported that Sutter failed badly in  
9 the RADV audit particularly in the areas of cancer, stroke and myocardial infarction. Like  
10 Relator, others from the group had also forwarded the medical record information UnitedHealth  
11 had requested. Cheung then directed all RAF Coder User Group members to not, under any  
12 circumstances, submit medical records, as they had all just done. If they received such requests in  
13 the future, they were to forward the medical records solely to Cheung.

14           95. On March 31, 2014, Relator met with Cheung, Driver-Zuniga, Dr. Vahamaki,  
15 Sutter RAF Program Senior Analyst Arvin Magusara, and Michelle Tulier from Optum, a  
16 UnitedHealth affiliate. The purpose of the meeting was to strategize on further improving RAF  
17 scores. On April 4, 2014, Tulier sent an email to the meeting's participants with a copy to Nancy  
18 McGinnis, Sutter's RAF Director. With regard to the RADV audit, Tulier referenced training the  
19 physicians whose patients were audited to improve their coding and documentation, but there was  
20 no discussion about expanding physician training Sutter-wide on accurate RAF coding. More  
21 importantly, there was no discussion of expanding focus auditing to remove known improper  
22 codes in their encounter data evidenced by the Sutter-wide failures in the RADV audit.

23           96. On July 22, 2014, Relator sent an email to Kris Crow, PAMF Director of Coding  
24 and Education, to draw Crow's attention to the scope of potential liability PAMF could be facing  
25 if the RADV audit failures were extrapolated, triggering potentially massive refunds. Relator  
26 used the ICD-9 code from Patient A's records and how many times that same ICD-9 mapped to  
27 an HCC for PAMF patients. She found there were 484 such submissions in 2010. She then  
28 conservatively estimated a payment for the HCC (\$4,000) and extrapolated out the scope of

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1 PAMF’s potential liability on this HCC for that year by multiplying the total instances of the  
 2 HCC by the average payment – 484 x 4,000. This was a total of \$1,936,000, which Relator wrote  
 3 “is probably low.” Since PAMF represented only a fraction of Sutter’s Medicare Advantage  
 4 participants, the \$1.9 million represented only a fraction of Sutter’s total potential liability from  
 5 the 2010 RADV audit just for this particular HCC.

6 97. On July 29, 2014, Relator sent Crow another email regarding the cancer and stroke  
 7 failures in the RADV audit, writing “two HCC conditions that came up in the RADV audit were  
 8 cancer and stroke. I could not find documentation to support it in the encounters Medicare is  
 9 requesting. Based on this, it is my recommendation that we implement a ‘focus’ audit around  
 10 these 2 conditions and mandate a mass training to all providers to correct and educate.” Given  
 11 the Sutter-wide failures in the RADV audit, conducting the audit Relator recommended at all  
 12 affiliates was the only way Sutter could identify the full scope of its coding failures and Medicare  
 13 overpayments and prevent them from recurring. As described below, Relator repeated her  
 14 recommendations to Cheung, Driver-Zuniga and her counterparts at Sutter’s other affiliates.

15 98. In July 2014, Cheung invited Relator to participate in the “Peak Audit,” a chart  
 16 review by an outside vendor for dates of service from 2013-July 2014 across all Sutter affiliates  
 17 that Optum requested Sutter undertake. Relator responded to the invitation writing “it might be a  
 18 better investment to hire our own (additional) auditors” to “improve[] documentation and increase  
 19 ‘compliant’ capture of HCC in the future.” Cheung responded that “one vocal leader believes  
 20 that it’s worthwhile as long as the \$ earned exceeds \$ spent,” reinforcing the Sutter approach of  
 21 allocating resources in its RAF program only for the purpose of increasing RAF scores and  
 22 revenue. Cheung also expressed frustration that in the face of known Sutter-wide coding failures,  
 23 Sutter was not taking the necessary steps to prevent these failures from recurring: “We keep  
 24 spending money to find the same issues, but we’re not preventing it from happening again.”

25 99. Like the RADV audit, the Peak Audit revealed widespread false coding across  
 26 Sutter’s affiliates, requiring Sutter to delete thousands of unsupported diagnosis codes. In  
 27 December 2014, Relator exchanged emails with Sutter Physician Services’ Michael Aguilar, the  
 28 person performing the Medicare Advantage submissions Sutter-wide. According to Aguilar, “[a]s

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1 part of the Peak external vendor chart audit project which is now completed [Sutter Physician  
2 Services] did send in delete code records that were sent to me by Peak.” Aguilar confirmed that,  
3 except for the Peak Audit, Sutter had no process in place to submit deletes for unsupported  
4 diagnoses in RAF encounter data. But Sutter knew the unsupported diagnoses the Peak Audit  
5 uncovered were not a one-off “project” it could consider complete. Unsupported diagnoses that  
6 needed to be deleted were an ongoing, system-wide problem dating back to 2010 dates of service,  
7 as shown in the RADV audit. Even after deleting thousands of unsupported diagnosis codes  
8 found in the Peak Audit, Sutter once again did nothing to identify the full scope of the false  
9 coding and “prevent[] it from happening again.” Sutter continued its campaign to increase RAF  
10 scores across all affiliates without fixing known “issues” and to pay relatively small amounts in  
11 refunds as a cost of doing business whenever Sutter got caught by CMS in a chart review or audit.

12 100. Relator also was aware of at least two UnitedHealth auditing “projects” at PAMF  
13 and Sutter Gould that were ongoing while she was at PAMF. The “Delete Project” found  
14 unsupported diagnostic codes for 2012 dates of service. The “Remediation Project,” aka the  
15 “Wrong Diagnosis Project,” found HCCs added at an encounter that was not a valid face-to-face  
16 physician visit. This arose when medical assistants were administering injections, but the visits  
17 were coded as patients seen by physicians. CMS will not consider an HCC diagnosis code  
18 associated with an immunization or therapeutic injection for reimbursement when administered  
19 by a medical assistant. Again, since these audits were treated as discrete projects, Sutter never  
20 expanded them to root out known false coding issues Sutter-wide or take steps to “prevent[] it  
21 from happening again.”

22 101. Other than these “projects” and the auditing Relator attempted to perform at  
23 PAMF, described below, Relator is unaware of other audits at Sutter to address the known  
24 problem of unsupported HCCs in the medical records CMS was using as the basis to calculate  
25 Sutter’s Medicare Advantage reimbursements. If Sutter had performed any such audits, Relator  
26 would have known through her regular participation in the RAF Coder User Group and her  
27 regular interactions with the Physician Champions and her RAF counterparts at the other Sutter  
28 affiliates. Instead, Relator heard at these meetings and in her interactions that no affiliates were

1 doing audits to remove unsupported HCCs or prevent them from recurring. They faced resistance  
 2 from Sutter management to do this kind of auditing, the same resistance Relator found when  
 3 attempting to conduct these audits at PAMF.

4  
 5 **V. PAMF'S RAF PROGRAM FAILURES PROVIDED ANOTHER RED FLAG TO**  
 6 **SUTTER OF SYSTEM-WIDE INACCURATE CODING AND OVERPAYMENTS**

7 102. Soon after her arrival at PAMF in 2013 Relator grew concerned that Sutter had  
 8 been operating its RAF program since 2010 only to capture lucrative HCC codes doing little, if  
 9 anything, to assure the accuracy of the diagnosis data used to calculate its capitation payments.

10 103. As of May 2013, Relator found (1) no Sutter policies or procedures regarding the  
 11 Medicare Advantage Program to review; (2) no audits or results of any Sutter accuracy testing  
 12 from prior years or months; (3) no correspondence from any of Sutter's MAOs or expected  
 13 Standards of Conduct in operating the Medicare Advantage Program; and (4) no sign-in sheets  
 14 evidencing any RAF training of any healthcare professionals at any time. There also were no  
 15 employees at PAMF working on RAF support even though PAMF had more than 8,000 patients  
 16 enrolled in the Medicare Advantage Program at that time. Relator was the only (and apparently  
 17 first) PAMF employee with coding and auditing duties working on issues of risk adjustment in  
 18 PAMF's Medicare Advantage Program. The approximately 57 other PAMF employees with  
 19 coding and auditing duties were all working on revenue cycle/fee-for-service coding supporting  
 20 PAMF's traditional Medicare and private insurance billing.

21 104. PAMF was not unique among the Sutter affiliates. Relator searched on Sutter's  
 22 intranet for relevant RAF policies and procedures at Sutter's other affiliates. Aside from the  
 23 Overpayment Policy, Relator found no policies or procedures relevant to a RAF program.  
 24 Relator also asked her peers at the other affiliates and the Physician Champions, but none of them  
 25 could point her to any relevant materials either. Thus, as of May 2013, there was no formalized  
 26 support for the Medicare Advantage Program with approximately 48,000 patients enrolled in  
 27 plans Sutter-wide.

28 ///

///

**A. Relator's Baseline Coding Audits at PAMF Showed High Error Rates**

1  
2 105. Since Sutter had not conducted any audits or other testing to establish an accuracy  
3 baseline for RAF diagnosis coding at PAMF, Relator began randomly auditing primary care  
4 physician encounters<sup>1</sup> to understand PAMF's existing systems. The results would direct what  
5 issues to focus on with physician training, a part of the job responsibilities for which she was  
6 initially hired. Relator's initial primary care physician encounter audits were for dates of service  
7 in 2013. She looked at 42 primary care physician encounters identifying 62 HCCs. Of the 62  
8 HCCs identified, 53 of them were incorrect because the documentation in the patient's medical  
9 records did not support the HCCs according to the ICD coding guidelines in place at the time  
10 (ICD-9 in 2013). These results represented an 85% failure rate.

11 106. Relator also audited PAMF's Physician Champions -- the physicians paid to train  
12 other physicians how to properly code HCCs. They failed too. Relator shared the results of her  
13 primary care physician and Champion audits with Dr. Vahamaki, PAMF's lead Champion and the  
14 person with supposed responsibility for primary care physician training and one-on-one  
15 mentoring for accurate diagnostic coding. Dr. Vahamaki expressed concern with the results of  
16 Relator's audits. She emphasized to him that the primary care physicians needed more training in  
17 accurate RAF coding.

18 107. Relator also reported the results of her audits to Cliff and Crow. Based on  
19 Relator's audit results, PAMF agreed to create five full-time employee positions to audit risk  
20 adjustment data in PAMF's Medicare Advantage Program (the "RAF Auditors"). Since the cost  
21 of five full-time employees, including salaries and benefits, totaled hundreds of thousands of  
22 dollars, Relator understood that Sutter Regional Vice President of Finance/PAMF CFO Larsen, at  
23 a minimum, knew why PAMF was hiring five new employees and changing Relator's job  
24 description after only a few months -- namely, because Relator had exposed widespread coding  
25 inaccuracies that needed to be fixed and prevented going forward. However, Sutter did not  
26 authorize additional resources to expand audits Sutter-wide even though other affiliates needed

27  
28 <sup>1</sup> An encounter is a face to face physician visit. 42 C.F.R. § 410.2(6).

1 help training their physicians on accurate coding too. In 2015, for example, a coder from Sutter  
2 Gould “[a]cknowledged that they need to get out of the office to support the clinicians, but this is  
3 a challenge with just two of them to support 100 physicians.”

4 108. Following Crow’s direction to justify hiring the five RAF Auditors, Relator  
5 created a Corrective Action Plan. In the Corrective Action Plan, Relator made clear the purpose  
6 of her initial audit had been to identify the accuracy rates of the primary care physicians,  
7 something which neither PAMF nor Sutter had captured as of June 2013. When Relator became  
8 responsible for implementing these corrective measures and supervising the RAF Auditors, her  
9 title was changed to reflect these new responsibilities. Her new title was PAMF’s RAF Coding  
10 Manager.

11 **B. Relator Created a Formal RAF Training Guide For Sutter-Wide Use and**  
12 **Was Recognized For Promoting Best RAF Practices Throughout Sutter**

13 109. To improve coding accuracy, Relator knew physicians needed to be trained on  
14 how to properly document health conditions during the patient encounters. In Relator’s  
15 employment before Sutter supporting a Medicare Advantage Program, trainers had detailed  
16 guides to help the physicians learn how to do this. When Relator did not find any training  
17 manuals at PAMF, she inquired of her peers in other Sutter affiliates if they had any training  
18 materials she could use. There were none.

19 110. Similarly, the Physician Champions did not have any materials that could be  
20 utilized for primary care physician training. The Physician Champions (1) did not use formalized  
21 training materials on how to code HCCs accurately with the primary care physicians; (2) did not  
22 document whatever training they did; and (3) did not have quality control measures, including  
23 auditing, to ensure whatever training they were providing was both accurate and effective.

24 111. Since neither PAMF nor Sutter had any meaningful policies or procedures for the  
25 auditing or training of HCC coding, Relator’s Corrective Action Plan also outlined her plan to (1)  
26 develop policies and procedures that met all applicable requirements and established a consistent,  
27 compliant process for auditing, queries, and provider coaching; (2) develop short training  
28



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1 modules and single-page tip sheets explaining Medicare requirements for documentation; and (3)  
 2 monitor the audit results for consistency and training opportunities.

3 112. Relator assembled a binder with policies and procedures, audit plans, training  
 4 plans, training materials, tip sheets, coding guidelines, encounter audit<sup>2</sup> plans, and cancer, fracture  
 5 and stroke focus audit<sup>3</sup> plans. These materials were developed in accordance with and cited to the  
 6 AAPC and AHIMA Standards of Ethical Coding. Relator used the materials she assembled to  
 7 train her RAF Auditors.

8 113. Relator provided the binder to Sutter RAF Program Manager Cheung who gave  
 9 Relator “kudos” for the practices she developed. Cheung also recognized in an August 16, 2014  
 10 email, copied to Sutter Lead Coder Driver-Zuniga and Sutter RAF Director McGinnis, how  
 11 important Relator’s training materials were to ensure accurate coding system-wide at Sutter:

12 PAMF has successfully developed and implemented an audit program that not  
 13 only tracks the coding accuracy of clinicians, but oversees the consistency and  
 14 accuracy of the coding staff. *PAMF’s effort in this area will be of significant  
 value system-wide.*

15 We would like to recognize Palo Alto Medical Foundation for your progress in  
 16 acuity capture and reporting. Through the application of lean principles and  
 17 engagement of stakeholders in discussions concerning the quality of clinical  
 18 documentation, PAMF has implemented strategies that are providing benefit  
 beyond immediate RAF efforts. *In your pursuit of improved medical record  
 management, you have initiated critical conversations that have system-wide  
 impact. We appreciate your commitment to quality and value your dedication to  
 improving patient care.*

19 Relator forwarded Cheung’s email, attaching her review of the audit program Relator had  
 20 created, to Cliff, Larsen, and Robert Cross, Sutter’s Director Decision Support, among others,  
 21 with a copy to Dr. Vahamaki.

22  
 23 \_\_\_\_\_  
 24 <sup>2</sup> An encounter audit is a tool to measure whether a primary care physician is complying with the  
 25 coding guidelines, or not. It looks solely at what data a primary care physician enters in a specific  
 patient encounter. Encounter audits are commonly used to obtain an accuracy rate for a specific  
 provider.

26  
 27 <sup>3</sup> A focus audit looks at a patient’s history for the entire year to try to validate the HCC for that  
 28 year. If there is no supporting documentation for the HCC, it must be deleted. The delete will  
 cause the reimbursement for that patient to go down.



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1 114. As Relator's peers in Sutter's other affiliates learned what Relator was doing, they  
 2 asked for materials they could use since they also had no materials to train their physicians.  
 3 Relator provided the coding guide she assembled among other materials. For example, when the  
 4 ICD standard moved from ICD-9 to ICD-10 with direct impact on how diagnoses would map to  
 5 HCCs, Relator prepared information for her group at PAMF, and also for her peers at the other  
 6 affiliates and the Physician Champions system-wide. After one Champions Meeting in 2015  
 7 where the need for training materials was discussed, Relator followed up with an email to Cheung  
 8 offering, "I have lots and lots of training materials if you are interested." Relator's list included:  
 9 (1) New Provider; (2) Oncology; (3) Ear Nose and Throat; (4) Infectious Disease; (5)  
 10 Nephrology; (6) Neurology; (7) Obstetrics/Gynecology Oncology; (8) Ophthalmology; (9)  
 11 Psychology; (10) Pulmonology; (11) Cancer; (12) Fracture; (13) Stroke; and (14) Major  
 12 Depression. Cheung never responded. Relator also fielded individual calls and emails from her  
 13 peers with "Coding Questions" like Sutter Gould's Susan Rutherford who emailed with a coding  
 14 question regarding thrombocytopenia, a high value HCC on the list of those Sutter wanted to  
 15 capture. Relator responded with guidance on steps to follow to assure the patient's medical  
 16 record would be coded properly.

17 115. Relator's 2013 Performance Evaluation praised Relator's efforts to provide best  
 18 practices Sutter-wide:

19 Kathy not only built a fully functioning auditing team from the ground up but also  
 20 established mutually beneficial relationships with clinical operations within  
 21 PAMF. *Kathy hasn't limited her gift of collaboration with PAMF, but has also*  
 22 *buil[t] strong relationships with Sutter Medical Network as well as the other*  
*Sutter Foundations. Within Sutter she is known as a resource for RAF, she is*  
*sought [out] by others to share best practices . . .*

### 23 C. Relator's Encounter Audits Showed High Error Rates

24 116. With initial support from PAMF, Relator began to implement the Corrective  
 25 Action Plan with a detailed action plan to use the newly hired RAF Auditors to perform encounter  
 26 audits. From these encounter audits Relator expected to establish an accuracy rate for the primary  
 27 care physicians coding HCCs. This would identify which primary care physicians needed  
 28

1 coaching or other training on proper HCC coding. Relator's RAF Auditors started conducting ten  
2 encounter audits per primary care physician per quarter for 2013 dates of service.

3 117. These primary care physician encounter audits quickly revealed the primary care  
4 physicians had little to no training in proper HCC coding. On June 3, 2014, Relator reported the  
5 preliminary results of the 2013 encounter audits, which showed 1,082 false risk-adjusting codes  
6 out of a total of 2,226 patient encounters her group audited. This represented a 51.4% accuracy  
7 rate.

8 118. Relator published these results for all PAMF employees, including executive  
9 management. She also apprised Sutter management of the poor results through Sutter Vice  
10 President of Finance Larsen, and Sutter Director Decision Support Cross. Relator also provided  
11 the results to Dr. Vahamaki who said the high failure rates should motivate the physicians to be  
12 more accurate in their coding.

13 119. In July 2014, approximately one year after the random audits of PAMF physicians  
14 she first conducted, Relator conducted another random audit of 20 primary care physician  
15 encounters to establish their baseline accuracy rate. The failure rates of this audit were even  
16 worse. Of the 20 encounters audited 18 failed, yielding a 90% failure rate.

17 120. As of the time Relator left Sutter in May 2015, no other Sutter affiliates undertook  
18 the baseline accuracy testing Relator had initiated at PAMF. Sutter failed to conduct any baseline  
19 auditing outside PAMF despite the strong evidence of coding failures across all affiliates as  
20 demonstrated by (1) the high failure rates from Relator's encounter audits; (2) the high failure  
21 rates in the PAMF Physician Champions audits; and (3) Cheung's admission that PAMF was not  
22 unique in having unsupported and inaccurate diagnosis coding.

23 121. Without baseline accuracy rates or any subsequent comparisons or auditing, Sutter  
24 had no basis to certify the risk adjustment data it submitted to CMS was accurate, truthful and  
25 complete as it was required to do as a condition of receiving Medicare reimbursement. *See* 42  
26 C.F.R. § 422.504(1). In fact, any such certification would have been patently false given the  
27 numerous red flags informing Sutter the data was not accurate, truthful or complete.

28 Unsurprisingly, as the Government explains in its Complaint in Intervention, when Sutter did

1 eventually undertake baseline auditing at its other affiliates some two years later -- after Relator  
 2 filed this case -- it resulted in the same poor results Relator found at PAMF. Compl. in  
 3 Intervention, Dkt. 41, ¶ 124.

4  
 5 **D. Relator’s Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit Also Showed High Error Rates**

6 **1. The Need to Audit Cancer Fracture Stroke Coding**

7 122. Relator’s assessment as a certified coder with six years of RAF experience was  
 8 that Sutter had a pervasive problem of submitting inaccurate and unsupported diagnosis codes  
 9 resulting in inappropriate Medicare reimbursement. Moreover, as Sutter RAF Program Manager  
 10 Cheung admitted, Sutter kept “find[ing] the same issues” without “preventing it from happening  
 11 again.” Under these circumstances, best practices (supported by both AHIMA and AAPC  
 12 standards of ethical coding), Sutter’s own Medicare Overpayment Refunds Policy (requiring  
 13 Sutter and its affiliates to “take remedial steps to prevent identified overpayments from  
 14 recurring”), and Sutter’s obligation to deal honestly with the Government dictated that Sutter  
 15 conduct focus audits of all HCCs across all affiliates to fix this known problem and determine the  
 16 amount of Medicare overpayments Sutter knew it needed to refund to CMS. Since Relator was  
 17 hired to support PAMF’s RAF program, that is where she started.

18 123. Constrained by limited staffing, Relator began with auditing diagnoses for cancer,  
 19 fracture and stroke, mapping to HCCs 10, 99, 100, 169 and 170 with 2013 dates of service.  
 20 Relator started with this limited audit plan of five HCCs to account for the work she and her team  
 21 were also doing with the ongoing primary care physician encounter audits and physician training.  
 22 Relator expected her RAF Auditors would then expand the focus auditing to include other HCCs  
 23 and other years of service in the future.

24 124. To address the Sutter-wide need, Relator urged Cheung, Driver-Zuniga and her  
 25 peers at the other affiliates to conduct similar focus audits. At a RAF Coder User Group meeting  
 26 in Green Valley in the fall of 2013, Relator described during the Round Robin exchange that she  
 27 was conducting encounter audits to establish accuracy baselines for the physicians and would  
 28 soon start a focus audit for cancer, fracture and stroke.

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1           125. Relator impressed upon the group the particular need to focus on improper coding  
2 of cancer, fracture and stroke. She explained that inaccuracies with these HCCs, especially  
3 miscoding these conditions as “active” instead of “history of,” were a well-known problem for  
4 which they all needed to be auditing. Lynn Moura added that the same problem existed for  
5 myocardial infarction. Relator also used the example of miscoding a condition as “chronic” or  
6 “active” rather than “history of” because it clearly illustrated the connection between inaccurate  
7 coding and Medicare overpayments. CMS increased reimbursement for treatment of patients  
8 with active or chronic conditions but not when the patient only had a history of a prior condition.  
9 Therefore, if a diagnosis of “active” cancer, fracture or stroke was left in the patient’s medical  
10 record when the condition was no longer active, this false coding led directly to providers like  
11 Sutter receiving higher Medicare reimbursement for a condition the patient did not have. In other  
12 words, when the patient did not have “active” cancer, fracture or stroke, providers like Sutter  
13 would receive reimbursement for services they were not actually providing -- treating active  
14 cancer, fracture or stroke. The reimbursements for these serious conditions could represent  
15 thousands of dollars in overpayments per patient per year. From her more than six years’  
16 experience supporting another Medicare Advantage Program, she was aware that providers  
17 regularly refunded millions of dollars for improperly coding these very conditions.

18           126. Relator stressed to the group that Sutter needed to train its physicians on accurate  
19 HCC coding and its direct connection to reimbursement under the Medicare Advantage Program  
20 to prevent this and other inaccurate coding from happening *in the future*. Equally important,  
21 Sutter needed to conduct audits to ascertain the extent to which coding *in the past* was improper  
22 for the tens of thousands of patients enrolled in Sutter’s Medicare Advantage plans and to return  
23 overpayments everyone knew existed across Sutter’s affiliates.

24           127. Cheung, Driver-Zuniga and the RAF Coder User Group members never expressed  
25 doubt or reservation that each of the affiliates needed to embrace the RAF best practices of  
26 physician training and auditing. Just the opposite. They were uniform in the view these audits  
27 and training needed to happen Sutter-wide.

28 ///

## 2. PAMF Fails Relator's Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit

128. The Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit Relator and her RAF Auditors team conducted was more inclusive than the primary care physician encounter audits because it covered every instance where the five HCCs mapping to those medical conditions would have been used during the year. It was not limited to just the primary care physician encounters.

129. Further, Relator's team developed tools to delete the unsupported coding and initiate a refund of the Medicare overpayment. To do so, Relator worked with individuals at PAMF and Sutter Physician Services to understand how Sutter's billing mechanisms worked for the Medicare Advantage Program and to initiate the refunds of overpayments she and her team uncovered in the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit. As described above, Sutter had no tools in place to submit deletes because Sutter had not previously initiated deletes other than those related to the Peak Audit. Relator obtained approval from PAMF management to delete the unsupported codes before she commenced the audit. This approval was short-lived.

130. After the audit began, Relator's goal of auditing all the data for the five HCCs for 2013 dates of service soon proved to be unrealistic for her small team of RAF Auditors given their other work on the encounter audits and physician training. Nevertheless, even without reviewing an entire year's worth of data, the trends evident from the results they had compiled showed pervasive failures with all five HCCs leading to significant Medicare overpayments to PAMF for the care of these Medicare Advantage patients.

131. Throughout the auditing process, Relator kept Cliff, Crow and Larsen updated on the results, including how many deletes were being submitted to CMS based on inaccurate coding in the encounters. In the summer of 2014, Cliff relayed to Relator an inquiry from Larsen who questioned why Relator was auditing risk adjustment data for which they had already been paid. Later, Cliff instructed Relator to stop submitting the deletes, citing Larsen's ongoing concern that Relator was auditing old data for which Sutter had already been paid. Larsen was particularly concerned about auditing the old data because he was trying to increase RAF scores, not make them more accurate, and particularly, not bring them down.

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1 132. Relator refused to participate in any attempt to avoid refunding known  
2 overpayments. She and the RAF Auditors continued the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit. In  
3 addition, Relator drafted a Revised Corrective Action Plan to ensure that PAMF “implements  
4 timely and effective actions when indicators reveal a need for a corrective action” because  
5 “PAMF has a responsibility to ensure all documentation supports reimbursement received.”

6 133. In the fall of 2014, Relator began to see that Sutter and PAMF management did  
7 not share her intention to make sure “all documentation supports reimbursement received.”  
8 Relator learned that Cheung, Larsen, McGinnis and Dr. Vahamaki, among others, were keeping  
9 her out of the loop on RAF-related discussions to promote their efforts to increase RAF scores  
10 without interference from Relator. Unsurprisingly, as outlined in its Complaint in Intervention,  
11 the Government, during its investigation of Relator’s allegations, obtained evidence of numerous  
12 communications explicitly excluding Relator relating to Sutter’s ongoing efforts to increase RAF  
13 scores without assuring the coding was accurate or the reimbursements appropriate, and in fact,  
14 knowing they were not. Compl. in Intervention, Dkt. 41, ¶¶ 104-07, 112.

15 134. On September 29, 2014, Relator attended a meeting of PAMF executive  
16 management, including Larsen, Cliff, Dr. Vahamaki, PAMF Chief Medical Officer Dr. Conroy,  
17 PAMF Medical Director for Quality Dr. Edward Yu, PAMF Medical Director of Information  
18 Technology Dr. Criss Morikawa, and PAMF Compliance Committee member Dr. Nilufer  
19 Vesuna. Relator gave a brief presentation on what she and her RAF Auditors were doing,  
20 including the Audit Plan. She specifically identified the five HCCs for cancer, fracture and stroke  
21 as significant compliance issues that needed to be remedied. She explained the pervasive  
22 miscoding of these conditions and the substantial Medicare overpayments Sutter was receiving as  
23 a result. Dr. Conroy reviewed the 2014 RAF Auditing Plan specifically identifying a “high  
24 priority-potential compliance issue” for cancer, fracture and stroke. Dr. Conroy told Relator the  
25 Auditing Plan “looks good” and “keep doing what you’re doing.”

26 135. At the conclusion of the September 29, 2014 meeting, Relator approached PAMF  
27 Compliance Committee member Dr. Vesuna and provided her with a folder containing a copy of  
28 the Corrective Action Plan and Revised Corrective Action Plan, together with a list of one-on-one

1 trainings with the physicians' comments. Relator explained that she had been through a Medicare  
2 audit before. She told Dr. Vesuna she had prepared a Corrective Action Plan based on that prior  
3 experience and her findings at PAMF to date, but that it was not going to mean anything unless  
4 someone signed off on it. She urged Dr. Vesuna to review the materials.

5 136. Several weeks later, Dr. Vesuna returned the folder to Relator telling her it was  
6 well-written and very thorough. Dr. Vesuna told Relator the Corrective Action Plan and Revised  
7 Corrective Action Plan were something the Director of Education and Coding needed to review.  
8 However, that position was now vacant after Crow transferred out of PAMF on or about August  
9 14, 2014.

10 137. On the afternoon of November 26, 2014 (the day before Thanksgiving), Relator  
11 was called to a meeting with Marcella Alaniz, PAMF Compliance Analyst; Jessica Lin, PAMF  
12 Compliance Analyst; and Mary Campbell, PAMF Project Manager, in Campbell's office. Alaniz  
13 told Relator she had never approved Relator's deleting HCCs from patients' medical records. She  
14 instructed Relator to stop all auditing immediately. This implemented Sutter Vice President of  
15 Finance Larsen's earlier directive that they should not be auditing records for which Sutter had  
16 already been paid. Relator instructed her team to stop all auditing, including the Cancer Fracture  
17 Stroke Audit and all encounter audits.

18 138. In sharp contrast, when it came to adding HCCs and increasing Sutter's revenue,  
19 Sutter embraced auditing, fixing the root cause and allocating the staff to make the necessary  
20 changes. For example, Sutter's RAF program "launched a data processing investigation to  
21 identify causes of lower-than-expected RAF scores" in 2014. From this investigation, Sutter  
22 learned that a significant contributing factor to the lower-than-expected RAF scores was CMS  
23 rejecting HCCs for technical deficiencies and Sutter not having a process for fixing the defect,  
24 resubmitting and thereby allowing for payment. In response, the Sutter Medical Network RAF  
25 Team partnered with Sutter Physician Services to support increasing RAF and "develop[ed] a  
26 workgroup to evaluate Encounter Rejections, Identify/Fix the Root Cause (future encounters)  
27 [and] Fix and resubmit (rejected encounters)." Sutter Physician Services even conducted an audit  
28 to establish how many rejected HCCs causing lower-than-expected RAF scores needed to be



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1 resubmitted. There were 3,131 of them. But that audit was only designed to identify HCCs with  
2 technical deficiencies that could be resubmitted for payment, not unsupported HCCs that should  
3 not have been submitted at all. The workgroup also included “affiliate liaisons” who worked with  
4 Sutter Physician Services to assure the rejected but lucrative HCC codes were resubmitted.  
5 Relator was among the affiliate liaisons assigned to work with Sutter Physician Services to get the  
6 rejected HCCs resubmitted and Sutter paid. Sutter Physician Services set up a queue with the  
7 rejected HCCs and the affiliate liaisons were tasked to go through the queue and analyze and fix  
8 the rejected HCCs in their list. The results of Sutter Physician Services’ investigation, including  
9 the audit to identify which HCCs needed to be resubmitted, were presented to the Physician  
10 Champions in November 2014 as part of its “accomplishment.” This was the same month that  
11 Sutter forced Relator to stop all auditing for inaccurate coding and Medicare overpayments.

12 139. The directive to Relator to stop all auditing was particularly telling given the  
13 known false coding and Medicare overpayments found in the RADV audit, the Peak Audit, the  
14 two UnitedHealth audits, and Relator’s ongoing Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit. Sutter  
15 clearly knew how to audit and create a remediation plan when it found lost RAF revenue  
16 opportunities as it did with its rejections audit. However, Sutter was unwilling to expand any  
17 audit, and indeed stopped auditing, those instances which would result in decreasing revenue and  
18 refunding overpayments.

19 140. Even though Sutter shut down the audits Relator was conducting, in December  
20 2014, she reported the results of the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit her team had compiled  
21 for the random sample of HCCs for cancer, stroke, and fracture with dates of services in 2013.  
22 She did so to document the pervasive coding failures leading to millions of dollars in Medicare  
23 overpayments. Significantly, less than half the encounters to be audited were completed before  
24 management directed that all auditing stop. In total, the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit  
25 refunded more than \$4.2 million after auditing less than half of the relevant encounters for 2013.

26 141. For HCC-10 (Cancer), the RAF Auditors reviewed 227 encounters out of a total of  
27 2,937 encounters reported in 2013 for patients for whom HCC-10 was submitted to CMS from  
28 Sutter’s PAMF affiliate. These 227 HCC-10 encounters were found in the medical records of 182

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1 patients. Out of the 182 patients where HCC-10 was submitted to CMS, only 18 patients had  
2 supporting documentation. For the other 164 patients, the documentation did not support HCC-  
3 10 according to ICD-9 guidelines and was therefore submitted to CMS in error. The RAF  
4 Auditors submitted refunds for those overpayments. Relator also calculated an HCC-10 accuracy  
5 rate of only 9.88% for PAMF in 2013 based on the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit.

6 142. For two HCCs for Stroke (HCC-99/100), the RAF Auditors reviewed 393  
7 encounters out of a total of 778 encounters reported in 2013 for patients for whom HCC-99/100  
8 was submitted to CMS from Sutter's PAMF affiliate. These 393 HCC-99/100 encounters were  
9 found in the medical records of 169 patients. Out of the 169 patients where HCC-99/100 was  
10 submitted to CMS, only seven patients had supporting documentation. For the other 162 patients,  
11 the documentation did not support HCC-99/100 according to ICD-9 guidelines and was therefore  
12 submitted to CMS in error. The RAF Auditors submitted refunds for those overpayments.  
13 Relator also calculated an HCC-99/100 accuracy rate of only 4.1% for PAMF in 2013 based on  
14 the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit.

15 143. For two HCCs for Fracture (HCC 169/170), the RAF Auditors reviewed 243  
16 encounters out of a total of 828 encounters reported in 2013 for patients for whom HCC-169/170  
17 was submitted to CMS from Sutter's PAMF affiliate. These 243 HCC-169/170 encounters were  
18 found in the medical records of 86 patients. Out of the 86 patients where HCC-169/170 was  
19 submitted to CMS, only 29 patients had supporting documentation. For the other 57 patients, the  
20 documentation did not support HCC-169/170 according to ICD-9 guidelines and was therefore  
21 submitted to CMS in error. The RAF Auditors submitted refunds for those overpayments.  
22 Relator also calculated an HCC-169/170 accuracy rate of only 33.7% for PAMF in 2013 based on  
23 the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit.

24 **3. Sutter Took No Action In Response to the Cancer Fracture**  
25 **Stroke Focus Audit Until After Relator Filed this Action**

26 144. Sutter management knew the results of the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit  
27 because Relator verbally presented the results to Sutter Vice President of Finance Larsen in  
28 September 2014 and provided him the written results in December 2014. Relator also reported

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1 the results to Sutter RAF Program Manager Cheung in January 2015. Relator wanted the  
2 inexperienced Cheung to understand the implications of shutting down the audit and failing to  
3 return known overpayments. She gave Cheung a description of the potential False Claims Act  
4 liability, including damages and penalties, in the same terms she outlined to PAMF's Chief  
5 Medical Officer in September 2014 when she reported the interim results of the Cancer Fracture  
6 Stroke Focus Audit to PAMF executives.

7 145. In addition, Dr. Vahamaki presented the audit results at the February 2015  
8 Physician Champions meeting in Green Valley. Two of the RAF Auditors further reported on the  
9 audit at the March 2015 RAF Coder User Group meeting. Sutter Director of Coding and  
10 Compliance Greta Fees also attended that meeting purporting to offer resources to ensure that all  
11 coding and documentation recommendations have legal review and support. Notably, it was the  
12 first time in Relator's experience where anyone from Sutter Compliance attended one of these  
13 meetings, and no one in the group was aware of, or had ever seen, the resources Fees claimed  
14 were available on the RAF portal. The only resources Relator ever saw on the RAF portal before  
15 this meeting related to how to increase RAF scores. Fees, who only weeks before had made a  
16 presentation on False Claims Act liability at an industry conference, knew Sutter's failure to make  
17 adequate corrective actions when confronted with an issue like unsupported diagnoses and failure  
18 to return overpayments could trigger False Claims Act liability. The title of that presentation was  
19 *When the Whistle Blows! Responding to a Potential Relator.*

20 146. Sutter Lead Coder Driver-Zuniga was also aware of the results of the Cancer  
21 Fracture Stroke Focus Audit and that further efforts to return known overpayments were being  
22 blocked by the time the RAF Coder User Group met again in April 2015. At that meeting, when  
23 Relator raised the issue of the known problems of coding cancer, fracture and stroke, Driver-  
24 Zuniga proposed that each affiliate audit cancer, fracture, stroke and heart attack for compliance.  
25 Everyone at the meeting, representing all of the Sutter affiliates, agreed the audits should be done.  
26 Sutter never allowed that to happen.

27 147. Sutter recently refunded \$30 million in overpayments for improper coding for  
28 cancer, fracture, stroke and heart attack with dates of service in 2010-2016 at Sutter affiliates

1 other than PAMF. Sutter only made this refund payment after Relator filed her complaint  
 2 alleging Sutter's violations of the False Claims Act for improper coding of these exact medical  
 3 conditions.

4  
 5 **VI. SUTTER KNOWINGLY SUBMITTED FALSE CLAIMS, RETAINED**  
 6 **MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, AND EXPANDED ITS SCHEME TO USE**  
 7 **AGGRESSIVE FALSE CODING TO INCREASE RAF SCORES SUTTER-WIDE**

8 148. When Sutter directed Relator to shut down the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit  
 9 in November 2014, it also instructed Relator that, going forward, the physicians would be the  
 10 only ones permitted to correct a patient encounter in Sutter's electronic medical records system.  
 11 Relator and the RAF Auditors were instructed to only audit the encounters after they were  
 12 completed and to note any inaccuracies in the billing side of the electronic medical records only.  
 13 This procedure brought PAMF in line with Sutter's other affiliates, which were also only making  
 14 necessary changes on the billing side.

15 149. Relator explained to Sutter management that removing unsupported codes on the  
 16 billing side of the electronic medical records -- as the other affiliates were already doing -- would  
 17 not stop the incorrect HCCs in the encounter data from being submitted to the MAO and then to  
 18 CMS for the Medicare Advantage patients. This is because payments are generated based on the  
 19 encounter data in a patient's medical record, not the billing side of the electronic medical records.  
 20 Sutter Physician Services' Michael Aguilar confirmed this to Relator the year before. "For all the  
 21 Sutter Foundations [Sutter Physician Services] is sending diagnostic code records *linked to*  
 22 *patient encounters* out of the EpicCare E[lectronic]M[edical]R[ecord] system to Optum every  
 23 month." In December 2014, Aguilar again confirmed the process. "We send Optum *encounter*  
 24 *data* as part of the EpicCare SMS sweep process." Relator stressed to Sutter management that  
 25 removing information from the billing file without deleting the known inaccurate HCCs in the  
 26 encounter data would continue to overbill CMS. Sutter's directive did not change.

27 150. Pursuant to that directive, Relator instructed the RAF Auditors to stop making any  
 28 changes in the encounter data and to instruct the physicians to make any necessary corrections in  
 the encounter data. Despite numerous attempts by Relator and the RAF Auditors to get the

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1 physicians to correct the coding inaccuracies in the encounter data, most physicians ignored or  
 2 refused to make the changes. The end result was Sutter failing to delete known false codes and  
 3 failing to refund known overpayments.

4 151. On or about February 23, 2015, Sutter RAF Program Manager Cheung further  
 5 confirmed that the other Sutter affiliates were using the procedure Relator was instructed to use at  
 6 PAMF starting in November 2014: auditing encounters at the time of service and only making  
 7 changes on the billing side of the electronic medical record, not in the encounter data. More  
 8 importantly, Cheung admitted changing the HCCs only on the billing side did not support  
 9 accurate submissions of risk adjustment data for the Medicare Advantage Program. Cheung  
 10 further admitted that Sutter knew unsupported HCCs caught by the auditors and removed in the  
 11 billing file were nonetheless being submitted to CMS for payment when the encounter data was  
 12 swept. This process caused CMS, in turn, to pay Sutter based on diagnosis codes Sutter knew  
 13 were false. Cheung shared Relator's concern that Sutter's practice did not comply with the  
 14 Medicare Advantage Program requirements. Cheung admitted this was a Sutter-wide problem  
 15 telling Relator they needed to "brainstorm" how to fix it because she did not know how.

16 152. In a February 24, 2015 "Meeting Preparation Memo" to the RAF Coder User  
 17 Group, Sutter Lead Coder Driver-Zuniga also confirmed the known system-wide problem causing  
 18 Sutter to submit false claims and retain known overpayments:

19 Due to limitations with the current preformatted electronic claim form in the  
 20 Sutter E[lectronic]H[ealth]R[ecord], only 12 diagnosis codes<sup>4</sup> can be submitted

21 <sup>4</sup> Encounters (physician office visits) with more than 12 diagnosis codes should have been another  
 22 red flag to Sutter that encounter data system-wide included false codes. It is implausible that  
 23 Sutter's physicians were *routinely* treating patients for 12 or more conditions in a standard office  
 24 visit (typically less than 30 minutes). *See Swoben*, 848 F. 3d at 1167-68 ("Each diagnosis code  
 25 submitted must be supported by a properly documented medical record"); CMS, *2008 Risk*  
 26 *Adjustment Data Technical Assistance for Medicare Advantage Organizations Participant Guide*,  
 27 § 7.1.5 (all diagnosis submitted for payment must be based on a face-to-face health service between  
 28 the patient and the provider). Worse, when Sutter implemented its sweep process it was intended  
 to support packing even more diagnosis codes into an encounter -- an even less plausible *routine*  
 course of patient care. More than a dozen diagnosis codes were only in the encounter data, as  
 Driver-Zuniga admitted, to "capture and report" for RAF and thereby increase reimbursement for  
 the lucrative HCCs to which the various diagnoses mapped.

1 per encounter. To overcome this limitation, a monthly “data sweep” was  
2 implemented several years back. While *the [data] sweep supports the capture*  
3 *and reporting of diagnostic information for RAF reporting, [Sutter Medical*  
4 *Network] has learned of an unintended consequence – the inclusion of HCC*  
5 *diagnosis codes removed from claims, but remaining in the Sutter*  
6 *E[lectronic]H[ealth]R[ecord].* To improve quality control, [Sutter Medical  
7 Network] would like for you to brainstorm with your affiliate, the pros and cons  
8 of potential solutions that can be used system-wide.

9 153. At a strategy meeting to raise RAF scores a month later, Cheung confirmed that  
10 Sutter still did not have a plan to stop the submission of false claims or return known  
11 overpayments. Cheung confirmed that CMS was still receiving HCCs that Sutter knew were  
12 false. Of course, the mechanisms Relator set up at PAMF to correctly delete the HCCs from the  
13 encounter data would have removed the false codes Sutter-wide. But Sutter management shut  
14 those mechanisms down to increase RAF scores so would not consider them as a “potential  
15 solution.”

16 154. Every unsupported HCC removed from the billing file by Sutter’s own auditors  
17 gave Sutter actual notice of false codes and triggered Sutter’s obligation to delete the codes from  
18 the encounter data on which CMS relies for calculating appropriate payment and to refund  
19 overpayments caused by those false codes. Further, each time Sutter failed to delete or withdraw  
20 codes it knew or should have known were false it also submitted, or caused the submission, of  
21 false claims.

22 155. Sutter’s system-wide failure to remove known improper codes was not the only  
23 system-wide failure Relator uncovered. In October 2014, Relator emailed Neil Knutsen, Sutter’s  
24 Subject Matter Expert for Coding/Billing, to raise a problem with “misleading labels” for stroke  
25 in Sutter’s electronic medical record. Because the system-wide label for stroke in the electronic  
26 medical record system says “within 8 weeks” providers were inaccurately capturing this HCC.  
27 When she did not receive a response, she emailed Knutsen again in January 2015 to make clear  
28 the “labels are causing providers to capture the incorrect ICD-9 codes and we’re being  
reimbursed inappropriately.” In response Knutsen told her “[t]his issue is still pending review by  
the Compliance Reimbursement Team.” He also indicated that even if Compliance responded,  
this was an ICD-9 issue so a fix was unlikely before they moved on to ICD 10. He suggested  
“[c]ontinued physician education may be the only possible solution at this point.” When Relator



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1 elevated the “misleading label” issue to Cheung she just echoed Knutsen’s response: “For better  
2 or worse, clinician education is the key.” Misleading codes for myocardial infarction and morbid  
3 obesity in Sutter’s medical records system were also causing providers to capture the incorrect  
4 codes and Sutter to be reimbursed inappropriately. Sutter ignored the inaccurate ICD-9 coding  
5 *already* in its electronic medical records and overpayments made to Sutter as a result. Moreover,  
6 since Sutter was not prioritizing this kind of physician training, Knutsen and Cheung’s  
7 suggestions were empty platitudes and not anything Sutter was actually doing to avoid a problem  
8 in the future. It was yet another example of Sutter “find[ing] the same issues, but . . . not  
9 preventing it from happening again.”

10 156. In February 2015, Christian Gabriel became PAMF’s Director of Education and  
11 Coding, the position vacated by Kris Crow in August 2014. Gabriel had no RAF experience but  
12 was responsible for supervising Relator and her team. Gabriel rebuffed Relator’s early efforts to  
13 re-start audits at PAMF given the known problems exposed in both the encounter and focus  
14 audits. Gabriel made clear his job was to increase the RAF revenue, not to be bothered with  
15 compliance issues. On March 9, 2015, he wrote to Relator: “Given the lack of progress in  
16 improving our RAF/HCC scores, please know that your team, structure and process is my #1  
17 focus so I am hoping you can be the great team player I know you can be.” Days later, Gabriel  
18 held a marathon meeting with his direct reports to announce new Sutter goals to raise revenue.  
19 One of the attendees reported to Relator, who was unable to attend, that Gabriel told them it was  
20 time to take off their compliance hats and put on their revenue hats. In another exchange with  
21 Relator, Gabriel candidly admitted: “Our compliance department does not have the bandwidth to  
22 investigate compliance concerns.” During the remainder of Relator’s tenure at PAMF, she  
23 witnessed Gabriel implement Sutter’s goals prioritizing revenue while ignoring its obligations to  
24 make sure the encounter data they submitted into the CMS pathway was accurate and to return  
25 any overpayments based on false coding.

26 157. Since Gabriel had no RAF experience he relied on Sutter’s lead Physician  
27 Champion, Dr. Vahamaki, and what was happening at other affiliates, for strategies to reach the  
28 stated goal of increasing PAMF’s RAF scores. One of the key strategies employed across all



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1 affiliates was using the patient’s problem list and a daily alert form to encourage physicians to  
 2 capture new HCCs and recapture old HCCs that had not yet been documented for the year. When  
 3 the problem lists and the daily alerts were not sufficiently successful in capturing HCCs, Sutter  
 4 modified the process to begin to “Tee-Up” the HCCs in the encounter for the physician. The  
 5 Sutter Medical affiliate reported to the RAF Coder User Group in March 2015 that it had been  
 6 using this process to “pre-load” the HCCs into the encounter for the physician. When Relator  
 7 discussed this practice with Gabriel and whether he would implement it at PAMF, he described it  
 8 as “aggressive” and said “they weren’t there yet.” Even Dr. Vahamaki questioned whether pre-  
 9 populating diagnosis codes in the patient’s actual encounter was proper. Nonetheless after  
 10 Relator left PAMF in May 2015, PAMF joined the other Sutter affiliates in “teeing up” the  
 11 encounters -- effectively capturing HCCs regardless of whether the physicians actually diagnosed  
 12 the patients with the medical conditions.

### 13 CMS RELIES ON ACCURATE CODING TO MAKE APPROPRIATE PAYMENT

14 158. As described above, Sutter knows CMS relies on accurate risk adjustment coding  
 15 to make appropriate payment through the Medicare Advantage Program. Sutter also knows, as it  
 16 summarized in its January 2015 MAP Report, that “the health status of the [Medicare Advantage]  
 17 patient population must be accurately reflected in order to obtain appropriate revenue” and that  
 18 HCCs are the “clinical component of the total Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) score.” Accurate  
 19 diagnosis codes reflecting the beneficiary’s health status are, therefore, squarely at the heart of the  
 20 Government’s goal of providing quality healthcare at the most cost-effective price.

21 159. MAOs have a duty to certify the accuracy, completeness and truthfulness of the  
 22 data in the “clinical component of the total Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) score” they submit, or  
 23 cause to be submitted, to CMS because this information is so important to “appropriate”  
 24 reimbursement for the care of the Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. 42 C.F.R. § 422.504(l) (the  
 25 duty to certify accuracy is “a condition for receiving a monthly payment”). This duty extends to  
 26 any provider, like Sutter, that may generate the data submitted or caused to be submitted to CMS.  
 27 42 C.F.R. § 422.504(l)(3) (“If such data are generated by a related entity, contractor, or  
 28 subcontractor ... such entity, contractor, or subcontractor must similarly certify (based on best

1 knowledge, information, and belief) the accuracy, completeness, and truthfulness of the data.”).  
 2 *See also* 42 C.F.R § 422.310 (discussing risk adjustment data).

3 160. In order to assure the accuracy of this information critical to “appropriate”  
 4 reimbursement, CMS and the MAOs conduct audits. When unsupported risk-adjustment data is  
 5 submitted into the reimbursement system, which Sutter describes as:  
 6 Sutter Affiliate → Sutter Physician Services → Clearinghouse → MAOs → Optum → CMS,  
 7 CMS requires the improper data be removed from the system and overpayments be reimbursed.  
 8 *See CMS, Medicare Managed Care Manual, Ch. 7, § 40 (June 7, 2013); Swoben, 848 F. 3d at*  
 9 *1176-77 & n.8.* The importance of all this to the Medicare Advantage Program, and Sutter’s  
 10 recognition of this importance, is further reflected in Sutter’s own policy to refund overpayments  
 11 pursuant to its duties under the Social Security Act as amended by the Patient Protection and  
 12 Affordable Care Act. *See supra* ¶ 60 (describing Overpayment Refund Policy).

13 161. Sutter knew that failing any audit, including a RADV audit, the Peak Audit, or an  
 14 internal focus audit like the one Relator was conducting until Sutter shut her down, would  
 15 obligate Sutter to refund overpayments potentially amounting to millions of dollars. Relator  
 16 explained this at multiple times to multiple Sutter decision-makers responsible for Sutter’s RAF  
 17 program, including, among others, Sutter’s Vice President of Finance Roger Larsen, Sutter’s RAF  
 18 Program Manager Julie Cheung, Sutter’s RAF Program Director Nancy McGinnis, Sutter’s  
 19 RAF/HCC Lead Coder Jessica Driver-Zuniga, and Sutter’s Lead Physician Champion Dr.  
 20 Vahamaki.

21 162. Sutter also knew Congress’s specific intent in creating the Medicare Advantage  
 22 Program was to reduce the cost of care associated with the traditional Medicare fee-for-service  
 23 program. *See Silingo, 904 F.3d at 672* (goal of the Part C program was to use a ‘capitation’  
 24 payment system “to improve the quality of care while safeguarding the public fisc”). Further, as  
 25 a provider of healthcare under the traditional fee-for-service model for decades, Sutter knew that  
 26 in order to protect the taxpayer dollars funding all Medicare programs Sutter through its affiliates  
 27 “must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.” *See Rock Island, Ark. & La.*  
 28 *R.R. Co., 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).* At all times relevant to this Complaint, Sutter knew it

1 needed to ensure its Medicare Advantage Program complied with Congress's goals for Part C of  
 2 improving quality of care and reducing costs. Indeed, Sutter's Regional Physician Champion of  
 3 Diagnostic Coding and Sutter Clinical Lead wrote: "We are just trying to code and document  
 4 correctly for Medicare (and all of our patients)."

5 163. Finally, Sutter knew its failure to remedy the pervasive false coding issues could  
 6 lead to FCA liability. Relator discussed this specifically in the context of shutting down the  
 7 Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit in January 2015. In addition, Sutter's Greta Fees, who was  
 8 brought in to meet with the RAF Coders User Group in the months immediately after Sutter  
 9 terminated the Cancer Fracture Stroke Focus Audit, knew that failing to repay known  
 10 overpayments to the Government would result in False Claims Act liability.

#### 11 HARM TO THE GOVERNMENT

12 164. By submitting false, improper and unsupported coding, Sutter has overbilled and  
 13 received improper payments from CMS amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

14 165. In 2015, for example, average monthly Medicare Advantage premiums in the  
 15 counties served by Sutter ranged from \$765 per month to \$867 per month (depending on the  
 16 County and the CMS-calculated "bonus rate") -- *before* Risk Adjustment Factors are even  
 17 considered. Taking \$800 per month as a conservative average, this means CMS's reimbursement  
 18 for the 50,237 Medicare Advantage patients in Sutter plans would be over \$482 million without  
 19 any Risk Adjustment payments at all. Even deducting a percentage of that amount for the MAO  
 20 acting as the intermediary, Sutter's payments likely exceeded \$400 million for just one year.

21 166. On April 9, 2019, Sutter, including all its affiliates with Medicare Advantage plans  
 22 except PAMF, signed a settlement agreeing to refund \$30 million to CMS to resolve allegations  
 23 by the Department of Justice and CMS of submitting improper payment data that inflated the  
 24 payments Sutter received. The settlement covered improper billing for medical conditions  
 25 including cancer, hip and vertebral fractures, strokes and myocardial infarction, involving six  
 26 HCCs for 2010-12, and seven HCCs for 2013-16.

27 167. In 2015, the settling affiliates accounted for 28,282, or 56.3% of Sutter's Medicare  
 28 Advantage patients, and the patients with the improperly billed HCCs covered by the settlement

1 account for a relatively small portion of the Sutter patient populations, even for the settling  
2 affiliates.

3 168. Inflating a patient's risk adjustment score has a 1:1 effect on what Medicare pays  
4 for a final monthly payment. That is, if Medicare paid Sutter \$9,600 per year for a patient with a  
5 risk adjustment score of 1.0, it would pay roughly three times as much for a patient with a risk  
6 adjustment score of 3.0, or \$28,800 per year.

7 169. Thus, Sutter's campaign to raise its risk adjustment score by 20% would convert to  
8 roughly \$100 million dollars in extra Medicare payments every year for Sutter.

9 170. The effects of Sutter's fraudulent scheme distorted Sutter's priorities away from  
10 compliance, which potentially *costs* Sutter money, and caused it to ensure that auditors focused  
11 on increasing RAF scores to improperly increase the money Sutter gets from Medicare. As an  
12 example, in 2015 Sutter's PAMF affiliate instituted a data mining plan which it executed at the  
13 very same time Gabriel, the Sutter employee implementing the plan, insisted to Relator that Sutter  
14 lacked the bandwidth for compliance. Sutter's data mining plan selected four of the high-yield  
15 HCCs. Indeed, Sutter emphasized that each of the four was a "high potential missed opportunity"  
16 summarized as follows:

17 <b>Diagnosis</b>	<b>HCC</b>	<b>RAF Increase</b>
18 Peripheral Vascular Disease	107/108	0.410/0.299
19 Congestive Heart Failure	85	0.368
20 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease	111	0.346
21 Major Depression	58	0.330

22 A 33% increase in a patient's risk factor would mean thousands of dollars in increased payments  
23 for each such patient.

24 171. Sutter's campaign was conducted despite Relator's repeated warnings to Sutter's  
25 corporate headquarters. In addition to the examples described above, on March 25, 2015, Relator  
26 wrote Cheung, warning her of "Poor documentation around CVA, CA, FX. I have reported my  
27 findings to our local compliance department and they have requested that we stop auditing."  
28 (CVA, CA, FX refers to medical shorthand for stroke [cardiovascular accident], cancer, and  
fracture.)

1 172. Accordingly, Relator expects that Sutter has submitted or caused the submission of  
 2 tens of thousands of false claims to CMS during the relevant period. Further, because Sutter has  
 3 known of these overpayments by CMS, the retention of each overpayment creates a new and  
 4 separate false claim for each overpayment not refunded after sixty (60) days. While the exact  
 5 amount will be proven at trial, the United States has paid hundreds of millions of dollars in  
 6 improper, inflated capitation payments under the Medicare Advantage Program as a result of  
 7 Sutter's scheme.

### 8 PUBLIC DISCLOSURE/ORIGINAL SOURCE

9 173. The facts alleged in this First Amended Complaint have not been previously  
 10 disclosed to the public and to the extent they have been disclosed to the Government, Relator was  
 11 the original source of these facts. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).

12 174. Even if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in this  
 13 complaint were publicly disclosed, the Relator is an "original source" as defined in 31 U.S.C.  
 14 § 3730(e)(4)(B). Relator has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to any  
 15 publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and voluntarily provided the information to the  
 16 Government before filing this action.

### 17 COUNT I

#### 18 Retention of Overpayments

#### 19 Violation of the False Claims Act – 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G)

20 175. Relator realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations made in Paragraphs  
 21 1 through 174 of this Complaint.

22 176. As described above, Sutter violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) when it knowingly  
 23 concealed and knowingly and improperly avoided or decreased an obligation to pay or transmit  
 24 money or property to the Government by failing to repay Medicare overpayments to which it was  
 25 not entitled.

26 177. Had CMS been aware of the knowing failure to return overpayments, it would  
 27 have taken steps to recover them.

1 178. By virtue of the alleged acts of concealment and/or improper avoidance, the  
 2 United States has incurred damages and therefore is entitled to treble damages under the FCA,  
 3 plus a civil penalty for each violation of the Act.

## 4 **COUNT II**

### 5 **Retention of Overpayments**

#### 6 **Violation of the False Claims Act – 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G)**

7 179. Relator realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations made in Paragraphs  
 8 1 through 174 of this Complaint.

9 180. As described above, Sutter violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) when it knowingly  
 10 made, used, and caused to be made or used, false records and statements material to an obligation  
 11 to pay or transmit money or property to the Government by creating false records and making  
 12 false statements relating to their failure to repay Medicare overpayments to which it was not  
 13 entitled.

14 181. Had CMS been aware of the knowing failure to return overpayments, it would  
 15 have taken steps to recover them.

16 182. By virtue of the false records, statements, and other acts of concealment and  
 17 improper avoidance alleged, the United States has incurred damages and therefore is entitled to  
 18 treble damages under the FCA, plus a civil penalty for each violation of the Act.

## 19 **COUNT III**

### 20 **Presentation of False or Fraudulent Claims In**

#### 21 **Violation of the False Claims Act – 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)**

22 183. Relator realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations made in Paragraphs  
 23 1 through 174 of this Complaint.

24 184. Sutter violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) by knowingly presenting and causing  
 25 the presentment of false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval resulting in inflated  
 26 Medicare reimbursements to which it was not entitled.

27 185. Had CMS been aware of Sutter's knowing false coding, it would have refused to  
 28 make risk-adjustment payments based on the false coding and/or pursued other legal remedies to

1 avoid the potential disruption of Medicare Advantage plan benefits to thousands of Medicare  
2 beneficiaries to whom Sutter provided healthcare services.

3 186. By virtue of the false or fraudulent claims alleged, the United States has incurred  
4 damages and therefore is entitled to treble damages under the FCA, plus a civil penalty for each  
5 violation of the Act.

#### 6 **COUNT IV**

#### 7 **False or Fraudulent Records and Statements**

#### 8 **Material to False or Fraudulent Claims**

#### 9 **Violation of the False Claims Act – 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)**

10 187. Relator realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations made in Paragraphs  
11 1 through 174 of this Complaint.

12 188. Sutter violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) by knowingly making, using, and  
13 causing to be made or used, false records and statements material to false or fraudulent claims  
14 resulting in inflated Medicare reimbursements to which it was not entitled.

15 189. Had CMS been aware of Sutter's knowing false coding, it would have refused to  
16 make risk-adjustment payments based on the false coding and/or pursued other legal remedies to  
17 avoid the potential disruption of Medicare Advantage plan benefits to thousands of Medicare  
18 beneficiaries to whom Sutter provided healthcare services.

19 190. By virtue of the false records and statements alleged, the United States has  
20 incurred damages and therefore is entitled to treble damages under the FCA, plus a civil penalty  
21 for each violation of the Act.

#### 22 **RELIEF REQUESTED**

23 WHEREFORE, Relator requests judgment be entered against Sutter, ordering that:

- 24 1. As to all counts for the violations of the Federal False Claims Act:
- 25 a. Sutter cease and desist from violating the False Claims Act, 31
- 26 U.S.C. § 3729 *et. seq.*;
- 27 b. Sutter pay an amount equal to three times the amount of
- 28 damages the United States has sustained because of Sutter's



actions, plus the maximum civil penalties against Sutter for each violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729;

c. Relator be awarded the maximum amount allowed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d);

d. Relator be awarded all costs of this action, including attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d);

2. Relator, on behalf of the United States, also requests that Relator be granted all such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY**

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, the Relator hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: April 23, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

**KELLER GROVER, LLP**

By: /s/ Kathleen R. Scanlan

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JEFFREY F. KELLER

**CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP**

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that she is an employee of Constantine Cannon and is a person of such age and discretion to be competent to serve papers. The undersigned further certifies that she is causing a copy of:

**Relator’s First Amended Complaint; Waiver of Service of Summons**

to be served on this date upon counsel for Defendants Sutter Health and Palo Alto Medical Foundation as follows:

Katherine Lauer, Esq.  
Latham & Watkins LLP  
12670 High Bluff Drive  
San Diego, CA 92130  
katherine.lauer@lw.com

\_\_\_ BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, by placing such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing U.S. mail in accordance with this offices practice.

\_\_\_ BY PERSONAL SERVICE, (MESSENGER)

X  FEDERAL EXPRESS

\_\_\_ FACSIMILE, (FAX) Telephone No.:

\_\_\_ BY E-MAIL: I caused each such document to be sent by email to the person or offices of each address above, such person having consented to service of documents by e-mail.

\_\_\_ CERTIFIED MAIL, by placing such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid in the designated area for outgoing U.S. mail in accordance with this offices practice.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: April 23, 2019

By:  /s/ Christine Zengel   
CHRISTINE ZENGEL